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Bruce A. Blonigen and Wesley W. Wilson

Ocean ports are vital hubs for transportation of internationally traded goods and therefore important for economic growth. In this chapter, the authors review the various methodologies that have been used to estimate the efficiency of ocean ports. They then refine and provide updated estimates of port efficiencies based on the methodology of Blonigen and Wilson (2008), compare these estimates of port efficiency with those using other methodologies, and evaluate their role in the level of trade costs and trade.

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Bruce A. Blonigen and Wesley W. Wilson

International trade has grown rapidly over the past half-century, which the transportation industry has accommodated through concomitant growth and technological change. But, while the connection between transport and trade flows is clear, the academic literature often looks at these two issues (international trade and transport) separately. This Handbook reviews the key concepts in each of these two literatures, while providing new insights into the intersection between them, including such topics as trade facilitation, trade networks, and the role of transport costs in offshoring, foreign investment location, and the role of intermediary firms. Each chapter points to where further study is needed and provides ideas for future research.

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Evgeniya Lukinova, Wesley W. Wilson and Mikhail Myagkov

The standard economic utility function considers defection to be the dominant strategy in the prisoners’ dilemma. Yet, in experiments, cooperative behavior is often observed even in one-shot games. Recent research suggests that framing as well as the substantive domain, i.e. where decision-makers act, matters and impacts outcomes. In this chapter we investigate the role of the “social domain” in the prisoners’ dilemma setting and test it in the laboratory experiments conducted in New Zealand, Russia and the United States. Other than in a standard prisoners’ dilemma, in these experiments, participants can endogenously select themselves into the game by a bidding mechanism and they can be ostracized depending on the votes by other players. We identify significant markers of prosocial behavior in the game and its change with time and experience. Although entering the social circle and playing prisoners’ dilemma does not ensure a bigger profit, participants demand social interactions. We find that in the social domain cooperation rates are significant and grow with the increase in demand for social relationships, but decrease with experience.