This chapter provides an overview of the institutional architecture for macro-economic governance in the EMU, analysing the role of the EU supranational and intergovernmental institutions and explaining their reciprocal interactions. Specifically, the author analyses the tasks of the Council, the Commission, the Eurogroup - including when this acts as the board of governors of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) - as well as the European Council and the Euro Summit, reflecting the complexity of coordination of economic affairs in the EU. Moreover, he details the limited powers of the European Parliament in EMU, and underlines the narrow justiciability of acts adopted by the intergovernmental institutions - as reflected in the case law of the European Court of Justice on crisis-response measures. As the author emphasizes, the inter-governmental response to the euro-crisis significantly affected the EU inter-institutional balance in economic governance, but this created challenges, including on the relation between the European Council and the Council, which will need to be addressed over time.
Alberto de Gregorio Merino
The European Banking Union (EBU) is the most innovative development of European administrative law since the Single European Act of 1986. It reshapes all the main parts of administrative law: general principles, organisation, procedure and guarantees. Yet, the incompleteness of the EBU (the “third pillar” is missing) makes the model incoherent. Other features must be solved soon, as the particular complexity of the regulation and the scope of judicial review. The first implementing experience of the EBU law shows some tensions among the ECB, the new SSM and SRB boards and the EU institutions; and also between the new European regulation and national rules, demonstrated by the first resolution cases. Despite the inevitable problems of a system established in a very short time with special characters, the EBU marks boldly the integration process. Its accountability must be considred in an original way, the “output legimitation”, distinct from the abused point of view of “democratic” legimitation.