An important difference between the traditions of experimentation in economics and psychology is that experimental economics has essentially banned the use of deception in laboratory experimental designs. There is, however, disagreement as to what constitutes “deception.” For example, it is generally considered acceptable to divide a group of participants into “matching groups” without telling them so. In this chapter, I discuss various forms of deception, the pros and cons of using them, and the experimental evidence on their effects. I also discuss the extent to which traditional objections to the use of deception in laboratory experiments carry over to field experiments.
The way you do an experiment, evaluate and report it, is unbelievably important and bears on the issue of the foundations of BE and EE, on issues of rationality and bounded rationality, self- and other-regarding behaviour, and the whole kaboodle. I discuss these questions: Is there a replicability and credibility crisis in the social sciences? Does the replicability crisis play out differently in economics and psychology? Are poor methodological and statistical practices (p-hacking? HARKing?) responsible for that state of affairs? What can be done? I argue that at the root of the problem lies the absence (presence) of a theoretical framework in much of psychology (economics). BE, allegedly enriching economic models with “insights from psychology”, is a mostly untheorized mess that does not provide the kind of theoretical framework that psychology, and behavioural economics, need.