This chapter critically analyses the methodology of the EU antitrust enforcement regime against its stated aim of punishing and deterring hard-core horizontal cartel infringements. It does this by addressing four key areas: (1) the substantive prohibition contained in Article 101 TFEU; (2) the method of calculating fines; (3) the use of leniency and settlement notices; and (4) the use of sanctions at the Member State level, as a complement to the enforcement work of the European Commission. It concludes that there are significant limitations to this regime’s deterrent effect and that further alternative sanctions to corporate fines are needed.
Stephan M. Liozu and Andreas Hinterhuber
Achim Kemmerling and Andreas Stephan
Timo Mitze and Andreas Stephan
Stephan Leixnering, Andrea Schikowitz and Renate E. Meyer
The Austrian COCOPS findings confirm the ongoing relevance of the traditional legalistic public sector norms and values. However, this traditional administrative culture is today supplemented with managerialistic and network-oriented ideas and orientations. Combining a focus on results with process orientation and increased networking and mediating activities between diverse actors and interests, we find hybrid forms of governance and executives’ role identities. For instance, shifting value priorities, such as emphasis of the relevance of results in general, go along with reluctant behaviour, such as a lack of actual performance management, underscored by the perception of low management autonomy. Thus, while managerial values and principles appear as incorporated in Austrian public executives’ role identities, in order to deal with shortcomings and contradictions with the existing system, they fall back to familiar practices: Basically, nothing is different, but everything’s changed.