Andrew D Mitchell
Foreign investment in general, and investor-State dispute settlement in particular, together form one of the most controversial aspects of the trade and investment law regimes in both Australia and New Zealand. The chapter outlines core aspects of Australia and New Zealand’s international investment agreements (IIAs), taking account of the traditional approaches in bilateral investment agreements (BITs) as well as the more modern approaches in investment chapters of preferential trade agreements. In doing so, the chapter identifies patterns and developments over time and assesses the extent to which the negotiators of both countries have drafted these treaties so as to protect their governments’ regulatory sovereignty with respect to matters such as public health and other non-trade/investment policy objectives. Therefore, first Australia and New Zealand’s IIA provisions are reviewed in respect of three key substantive investment obligations, then the two main types of ‘exceptions’ to investment obligations and ISDS.
Andrew D. Mitchell
Sanctions are by their nature discriminatory trade barriers and prime facie conflict with World Trade Organization (WTO) obligations if undertaken between WTO Members. However, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT) Article XXI (‘security exceptions’) expressly permits WTO Members to impose sanctions in certain situations. GATT art XXI(c) definitively covers only sanctions mandated by Security Council resolutions under ch VII. GATT art XXI(b), while allowing Members considerable discretion in taking unilateral sanctions on national security grounds, is nonetheless subject to more intensive review by WTO dispute settlement panels and the Appellate Body. A third type of sanction, in addition to UN and unilateral sanctions, is the so-called ‘hybrid’ sanction, which is related to but exceeds the scope of a ch VII resolution. In those circumstances, art XXI(c) will excuse that portion of the sanctions regime that complies with the ch VII resolution, but art XXI(b) must be relied upon to excuse the remaining portion. Specifically, for a WTO Member to justify measures pursuant to GATT art XXI(b), it must have determined that the scope of the relevant resolution leaves its essential security interest exposed, such that it considers trade restrictions necessary to protect them. Keywords World Trade Organization, GATT Article XXI, security council mandated sanctions, unilateral sanctions, hybrid sanctions