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  • Author or Editor: Asma Fattoum-Guedri x
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Asma Fattoum-Guedri and Frédéric Delmar

This chapter investigates the use of defensive mechanisms disconnecting cash flow rights from voting rights at initial public offering (IPO) by controlling shareholders. It specifically examines whether founder-chief executive officers (CEOs) are more inclined than non-founder-CEOs to implement defensive mechanisms at IPO. Building on intrinsic and extrinsic attributes distinguishing founder-CEOs from other types of CEOs, this study suggests that founder-CEOs, who are generally controlling shareholders of the company at IPO, are likely to be more anxious about a post-IPO change of control relative to non-founder-CEOs. This in turn makes them more inclined to use defensive mechanisms at IPO. Empirical support for these arguments is provided using a unique hand-collected dataset of all 467 IPOs completed in the French capital markets from 1992 to 2010.