Benoît Mayer
Benoît Mayer
Benoît Mayer
Benoît Mayer
Benoît Mayer
The Concept of Climate Migration
Advocacy and its Prospects
Benoît Mayer
Benoît Mayer
Under the international law of State responsibility, a State must pay reparation for the injury caused to other States by its internationally wrongful acts. This chapter questions whether this rule could provide grounds for normative arguments relating to the treatment of migrants in the context of climate change. It argues that it could not. Certainly, States bear some responsibilities, not just when and inasmuch as they fail to comply with their obligations under specific treaties such as the Kyoto Protocol, but also when they infringe norms of general international law such as the no-harm principle. States responsible for a breach of a primary international obligation bear a secondary obligation to make reparation, in particular by compensating the injured State(s). This, however, does not justify the imposition of specific obligations on the developing States affected by climate change to adopt particular policies on ‘climate migration’ beyond international human rights law. Measures allowing for the resettlement of foreign citizens as a form of reparation, on the other hand, appear unlikely to provide an effective protection to the human rights of the individuals concerned.
Benoît Mayer
Although the no-harm principle has been identified as the cornerstone of international environmental law, it has not generally been recognized as a central feature of international climate change governance. Enduring disagreements as to the relevant normative principles to international cooperation have long plagued international climate change negotiations. This article highlights the general legal and political relevance of the no-harm principle in relation to climate change, including the responsibility of states for breaking this principle. It thus suggests that the climate regime should be framed as a regime recognizing obligations and responsibilities rather than a regime of voluntary participation and assistance. The article includes a detailed account of the reception of the no-harm principle in climate negotiations, a response to three likely objections to the relevance of the no-harm principle, and some reflections on a possible, realistic interpretation of the no-harm principle in relation to climate change.