Let me start with the caveat that most of what I write is macro empirical research. While my examples will draw from strategy articles, the concepts are applicable to other management specialties, and other disciplines, as well. I have served on a wide variety of editorial boards, including those with both a generalist (for example, Academy of Management Journal, Journal of Management and Journal of Management Studies) and specialist (for example, Organizational Research Methods and Strategic Management Journal) focus, as well as those with interdisciplinary (for example, Corporate Governance: An International Review) and international (Management & Organization Review) emphases. Also, given my background, the vast majority of papers that I review are empirical. Regardless of the focus, one question consistently surfaces when I read a new manuscript: ‘If I were to design a study to test these research questions, is this the ideal sample?’ As the answer is most often ‘No’, the second question is whether the sample is adequate. In some cases, the answer is still ‘No’, and at other times it is the grudging acceptance of an imperfect, yet workable sample. In the majority of cases, though, the answer is ‘Hard to tell’, as authors may not provide sufficient information about the sampling process or characteristics of the data. Depending on the severity of reviewer concerns, sampling issues can be a fatal flaw that triggers a rejection, or can be enough of a problem to render an entire results and discussion section moot.
Marta A. Geletkanycz and Brian K. Boyd
The contemporary era of corporate governance is one marked by reform. Over the last two decades, a movement to revamp the nature of corporate boards has not only gathered unprecedented momentum, but delivered a wholesale revolution in board profiles and activities. Using the example of the U.S., this chapter presents an overview of major milestones, beginning with a summary of key initiatives by government, capital market/exchanges, professional associations, and other leading institutions, each intended to improve board effectiveness. The chapter also profiles the transformation in corporate boards – not solely changes to structure, composition, and activities, but also adjustments to underlying decision rights, director obligations, even interactions between board members and executives. This 21st century remaking of corporate boards reminds us corporate boards are not static phenomena. They are, in fact, dynamic. As corporate governance changes, so too must our approaches to related study. Implications for organizational research are discussed.