This chapter considers public enforcement of the securities laws in China. It draws on a unique, handcollected dataset comprising all 447 sanction decisions taken by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), China’s primary securities regulator, during the period from 2006 through 2012. This study reveals that the patterns of those efforts have shifted over time, from an initial focus on violations of disclosure rules to targeting a much wider spectrum of wrongdoing including, in particular, insider trading and investment advisor violations. In enforcing China’s securities laws, the CSRC also does not typically assume individual or corporate liability alone, but frequently holds culpable both firms and the individuals responsible for the malfeasance in question.

Little academic attention has been directed to how the interplay between China’s financial and economic regulators have helped to shape the way in which its financial sectors are regulated. Drawing on the case of Chinese venture capital regulation, this chapter argues that interagency competition for regulatory jurisdiction between two regulatory bodies under the State Council control, namely, the National Development and Reform Commission and China Securities Regulatory Commission, have fundamentally shaped the evolutionary trajectory of China’s venture capital regulatory framework. As a direct consequence of such competition, instances of regulatory fragmentation, overlaps and gaps can be found throughout China’s financial regulatory framework, in contexts ranging from rulemaking to rule implementation.