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Charles Goodhart

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Charles Goodhart

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Charles Goodhart

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Charles Goodhart

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Charles Goodhart

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Charles Goodhart

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Charles Goodhart

The tightening of bank regulation from October 2008 included a massive increase in capital/asset ratios in the leading nations. This may have been needed to restore banks’ credit-worthiness, notably in inter-bank dealings. However, the consequent ‘deleveraging’ was one reason that a surge in the monetary base did not lead – as the textbooks envisaged – to a corresponding surge in the quantity of money, broadly defined. Monetary policy did not work as expected.

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Charles Goodhart

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Charles Goodhart

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Charles Goodhart

It was some fifty years ago, when Harry Johnson came to the LSE and established his monetary seminar there, that Vicky Chick and I first met, and have remained friends and colleagues ever since. During these fifty years there have been several regime changes in monetary management. The Bretton Woods system of pegged exchange rates gave way in 1971–72 to a rather inchoate non-system of regional pegging (or fixing as in the euro-zone) combined with a – somewhat managed – float between major currencies. So, until the early 1970s, only the Fed in the USA had to concern itself with the principles, regime and rules for managing its domestic monetary system.