This chapter reviews recent developments in the extensive and growing experimental literature on coordination games. We divide our review into two separate parts. First, we review some recent studies on simple pure-matching, or Schelling, coordination games. These games are important for understanding basic elements of human coordination and, as recent work has shown, also useful for obtaining insights into complex social phenomena that are otherwise hard to study. We then conduct a selective survey of one of the areas of research on coordination games that has received the most attention in the past 15 years: weak-link games. These games are useful, because their basic underlying conflict between payoff dominance and safety is at the core of many important organizational and economic challenges. We conclude by discussing what we believe may be some promising future avenues for experiments on coordination games.
David J. Cooper and Roberto A. Weber
Jordi Brandts, David J. Cooper and Christina Rott
In this chapter we present a first survey of laboratory studies using communication. We first discuss a number of issues about the implementation of communication in the laboratory. In particular, we discuss variations in the channels, the structure and the content analysis of communication. Second, we survey a number of studies in which the effects of free-form communication are compared to those with more restricted communication. We finish with a brief reference to the question of why communication matters. In other words, what are the mechanisms through which communication affects behavior?