This chapter reviews the literature on gender and forced migration, situating this discussion in critical humanitarianism and debates on human security versus state security. While acknowledging existing scholarship on refugee women, the chapter highlights the need to study the spatial domains—home, work and the public sphere—in which displaced women’s identities are shaped. The chapter also signals the paucity of research on internally displaced people (IDP), including women. The chapter uses the case of Kachin internal displacement at the China–Myanmar border to illustrate the distinct challenges that IDP women face, reflected in their invisibility in the wider literature on forced migration. Since 2011 civil war has precipitated internal displacement in northern Myanmar. Such displaced people are not recognized by the 1951 Refugee Convention as “refugees” since they have not successfully crossed an international border. Denial of refugee identity and protection accentuates the vulnerability of IDP women as wives, mothers and citizens.
Elaine Lynn-Ee Ho
This chapter argues that the emotions constitute a habitus that functions as a backdrop in which individuals and social groups with partial membership and rights in a country deploy various forms of economic, social and cultural capital in order to approximate certain features or qualities of citizenship. The chapter directs attention to the importance of considering the ways in which emotions towards transnational migration and citizenship translate into less visible but no less important expressions of political subjectivity in everyday life. The authors focuses on the affective practice of Chinese diasporic descendants in Myanmar. Their migration biographies persist into later generations and impact the extent to which diasporic descendants experience citizenship inclusion or exclusion in the country they consider their natal land.
Elaine Lynn-Ee Ho
This chapter compares two distinct phases of diaspora engagement in Mainland China. Historically China has encouraged co-ethnics abroad to retain their ties to the ancestral homeland while simultaneously assimilating into their countries of immigration. Nonetheless, during 1949–1979 the Chinese state accepted successive cohorts of co-ethnics fleeing forced migration circumstances in Southeast Asia. Rather than categorizing them as refugees (nanqiao), China considered them returnees (guiqiao) and resettled them in state-owned farms even though many were diasporic descendants that had not lived in the ancestral homeland before. The policy was arguably motivated at that time by what the Chinese state considered its geopolitical claims to ethnic affinity with co-ethnics abroad. In comparison, China’s diaspora engagement today is focused more on the economic benefits to be derived from the human and financial capital represented by its co-ethnics abroad and their potential return migration. This is reflected in the programs developed as part of China’s diaspora strategy to court business and scientific knowledge in the Chinese diaspora. The initiatives today are also more likely to be targeted at highly skilled emigrants that left China after the 1980s. However, the contemporary diaspora strategy neglects other types of returnees, such as the ‘middling’ category that have difficulty finding jobs after spending a period of time abroad. They are referred to derogatorily in Chinese parlance as haidai (seaweed), an extension of an earlier label ‘haigui’ (sea turtles) used to describe returnees. By juxtaposing these two phases of Chinese policy towards diaspora engagement and their outcomes, this chapter thus critically examines the politics of emigration and return migration in China.