The Chinese economy has achieved great success in both stability and sustained growth since the market economy was established. This paper seeks to explain that success by evaluating China's fiscal policy. It starts by testing two hypotheses derived from Keynesian economics. First, it seeks to determine whether China's economic regulations act against the business cycle. Second, it aims to understand whether China stimulates economic growth through a deficit policy and strong government fixed-asset investment. Based on a Hodrick–Prescott filter technique combined with cross-correlation analysis and a Granger causality test, we suggest that fiscal policy in China is generally counter-cyclical and achieves its desired effects. Further analyses using a co-integration model and the impulse response function confirm that government fixed-asset investment enhances China's economic growth. These empirical findings indicate that China's fiscal policy matches the basic policy orientation of Keynesian economics and is closely associated with its economic success. We also identify some new findings that contradict Keynesian claims: China's economic growth responds positively to taxation, which we attribute to taxation's function in promoting appropriate resource allocation. We believe our study provides empirical support vindicating China's fiscal policy.
Xiao Kong and Feng Feng
Selected Papers of The Jurist (法学家), Volume 1
Among the various revolutions brought by the marriage of Internet and globalization, the revolution regarding business models and competition behaviors is the most remarkable. The use of technological methods for the attraction of consumers in virtual space has created a new landscape of competition. While countries have labored to find solutions in front of the new challenges, international treaty rules should be duly taken into account. Up until now, the Paris Convention is still the unique and basic international treaty which treats the subject of unfair competition. While most FTAs are silent in this regard, the EU Unfair Commercial Practices Directive and TPP have developed the consumer protection dimension to international anti-unfair competition law. Chinese courts and legislators are trying to work out a solution in the application of the general clause of the PRC Anti-Unfair Competition Law in Internet related cases, but they have much difficulty in establishing a reliable methodology of law interpretation or a consistent jurisprudence: some consider legitimate interests of plaintiffs are necessary; some consider it suffices to analyze directly the behavior of defendants; some define the limits of competitors’ behavior in terms of necessity of public interests, etc. In the construction of the Chinese autonomous legal concept of unfair competition, the Paris Convention, EU Unfair Commercial Practice Directive, and the TPP can yield important insight on national law. The general clause prohibiting unfair competition and the definition of three typical categories of unfair acts (acts creating confusion, acts discrediting competitors, and acts misleading consumers) in the Paris Convention, as well as the detailed provisions on fraudulent and deceptive activities in the EU Directive, provide constructive and operational reference in this respect. However, other categories of unfair competition acts need still be defined through the interpretation of honest practice and bad faith in view of the ethical and economic norms of Chinese society. Concerning the development of international law, it seems impossible to give more detail to the general clause of Article 10bis(2) of the Paris Convention except the addition of consumers’ welfare as another objective, but more convergence may be possible.
Chapter 17 claims that the Confucian norm of filial piety has been the cornerstone of the Chinese family. Under this cultural mandate, adult children have the moral responsibility for providing care and support, physically, financially, and emotionally, to their elderly parents. In China, the traditional family-based elder care system is being eroded by demographic shifts and socioeconomic changes in recent decades. China’s population is aging fast, and at the same time family size is shrinking and multigenerational households are waning. The availability of family caregivers is stretching thin, aggravated by increased population mobility and geographic dispersion of family members amid rapid urbanization and industrialization. Yet, China currently has a weak social safety net and is in the early stage of developing aged care services to meet the needs of an ever-increasing elderly population. This chapter discusses the continuity and changes in the age-old tradition of filial piety in a fast-changing society. The interface between the family-centered old age support system and emergent public policies to boost economic security and social services for the aged is also explored.
The populism tendency in public governance and its legal resolutions – on the example of conflicts by the PX programs
Selected Papers of The Jurist (法学家), Volume 5
The public events referring to the conflicts in the PX programs demonstrate that an obvious populism tendency exists in the public governance, which is harmful to deciding whether or not to enforce an industry program, to improving the ability of public participating by people and public governing by governments, and to increasing the whole social interest. The reasons include: governments’ path dependence on the closed decision-making model; the absence of professional and organized public participation; and the absence of the common sense of the rule of law against the background of the complex and structured social interest framework. We should reconstruct the common sense of the rule of law to meet the needs of the public governance practice, improve the legislatures of public decisions, strengthen the legal regulations on the making and rectifying of public plans and environmental impact assessment on public plans, especially improving public participation and information publicity of the existing laws, and introduce and strengthen the systems including risk assessment on social stability, emergency governance and dispute resolving, so as to deal with the populism tendency and behaviors appropriately, and to promote the public governance to be more scientific, democratic and meet the needs of the rule of law. Keywords: public governance; public participation; credibility; the rule of law in common sense
According to Chinese copyright law, internet service providers (ISPs) are jointly liable for the piracy of internet service users (ISUs) if they are aware of or have reason to know the latter's illegal acts, while the Trade Mark Law imposes joint liability on ISPs only if it is aware of the infringing acts of ISUs. As for the tort law, which is of general applicability, it provides that ISPs are jointly liable if they know of an ISU's tortious behaviour, but what constitutes this knowledge is quite controversial. A transversal study between these three laws shows that the term ‘have reason to know’ or ‘know’ in related rules should be interpreted as encompassing constructive knowledge and negligence, in order to conform with Chinese judicial practice. The divergence between these laws, other legal texts and judicial practice has given rise to disorder in the interpretation and application of Chinese law, and has broadened the scope of applicability of liability exemption clauses. The fundamental conditions for the determination of an ISP's liability are twofold: the ISP must have actual knowledge or constructive knowledge of the infringing act, or be negligent regarding the facts or circumstances related to the ISU's tort; and the illegal nature of the ISU's behaviour must be obvious or easy to recognize by a reasonably diligent person. The negligence of an ISP should be identified by the lack of appropriate and effective measures taken to prevent an ISU's torts. A general duty of care for ISPs has been introduced and developed by Chinese courts despite the fact that ISPs are generally regarded as not being subject to a general obligation to monitor the activities of ISUs.