Günther G. Schulze
Rational consumption addiction plays a role in international trade in cultural goods, though there is a cultural discount at work whereby people value goods from abroad less. There may be imbalance between trading nations, with one having built up cultural capital for the goods of another but the taste is not reciprocated, leading to hysteresis in international trade patterns. The patterns vary by the type of good, depending on the type of good and the extent of reproducibility. The chapter discusses trade patterns in a range of cultural goods.
Günther G. Schulze
The chapter reviews the various theories of the economics of superstars starting with Rosen’s seminal model and then turns to consider attempts to measure the effects on superstar artists’ revenues, in particular of the role of talent. It then goes on to discuss the impact of digitization in superstar markets in the cultural sector.
Günther G. Schulze and Nikita Zakharov
Russian corruption is the focus of this chapter, where the authors put forth an intriguing argument: the state holds wages artificially low, and in return officials reap the benefits of kickbacks and embezzlement, which cements their political loyalties. Unlike democracies, corruption in autocratic states may help to promote stability. They hold that this state of affairs is the path-dependent result of a long historical trajectory that finds its origins during the Mongol occupation in the thirteenth through the fifteenth centuries. This so-called kormlenie system of systemic corruption persisted after the Bolshevik revolution, all throughout the seven decades of the USSR, and into the current kleptocracy under Putin. The authors conclude by looking at strategies to rein in corruption, including higher salaries and legislative initiatives.