Carolina Castaldi and Giovanni Dosi
Benjamin Coriat and Giovanni Dosi
Andrea P. Bassanini and Giovanni Dosi
Giovanni Dosi and Luigi Marengo
In this chapter we analyze the characteristics and dynamics of organizations wherein members diverge in terms of the capabilities and visions they hold, and the interests which they pursue. In particular we examine how different forms of power can achieve coordination among such diverse capabilities, visions and interests while at the same time ensuring control and allowing mutual learning. By means of a simple simulation model of collective decisions by heterogeneous agents, we will examine three different forms of power, ranging from the power to design the organization, to the power to overrule by veto the decisions of others, to the power to shape the very preferences of the members of the organization. We study the efficiency of different balances between the three foregoing mechanisms, within a framework in which organizations indeed “aggregate” and make compatible different pieces of distributed knowledge, but the causation arrow also goes the other way round: organizations shape the characteristics and distribution of knowledge itself, and of the micro “visions” and judgments.
Giovanni Dosi and Marco Grazzi
Giovanni Dosi, Luigi Marengo and Corrado Pasquali
Giovanni Dosi, Marco Faillo and Luigi Marengo
Giovanni Dosi, Luigi Marengo and Alessandro Nuvolari
It is useful to distinguish two explanatory strategies in institutional economics: either institutions are derived from the choices of rational individuals with well-defined preferences, or preferences and indeed the very idea of rationality are derived from institutions. On the first view, institutions are crafted to perform coordinating and governance functions that enhance efficiency by mitigating contracting problems. On the latter, institutions reproduce path-dependently in a partly self-organizing process, irrespective of efficiency considerations. These differences translate into contrasting views of such key concepts as hierarchy, power, knowledge and learning in organizations. Given that each type of explanation contains a grain of truth, the challenge is to connect them. In line with empirical evidence regarding the influence of institutional arrangements on techno-economic change, the chapter calls for an ambitious research programme that addresses the coevolution of organizations, forms of rationality, preferences and technologies.
Marcello Minenna, Giovanni Dosi and Andrea Roventini
The recent financial literature seems to have reached a consensus about the influence of European Central Bank (ECB) unconventional monetary policies in explaining the multiple divergent trends of TARGET2 (T2) balances in the eurozone from 2010 and the ensuing segregation of risks in each national economy. According to the ECB, ‘mechanical’ effects in the accounting of government bonds explain the explosion of T2 balances. Divergence could therefore not be attributable to a ‘capital flight’ from peripheral economies towards northern Europe. Such an explanation does not seem to fit well with the analysed cases of Italy, Spain, and Germany. A decomposition of the T2 balances through the analysis of the financial accounts of the balance of payments shows indeed that the deterioration in the balances of Italy and Spain is mainly due to a shift of private-sector financial wealth from government securities to foreign assets (bonds, shares, and mutual funds). In the case of Germany, the abnormal growth of T2 balances is mainly attributed to the persistent influence of current-account surpluses reaching 6–8 percent of GDP and increasing due to the indirect effects of quantitative easing policies on the exchange rate between the euro and the other major international currencies.