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Edited by Giuseppe Eusepi and Friedrich Schneider

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Edited by Giuseppe Eusepi and Friedrich Schneider

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Edited by Giuseppe Eusepi and Friedrich Schneider

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Edited by Giuseppe Eusepi and Friedrich Schneider

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Edited by Giuseppe Eusepi and Friedrich Schneider

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Edited by Giuseppe Eusepi and Friedrich Schneider

This book makes a valuable, analytical contribution to recent debates on the ongoing institutional changes occurring within the European Union. It provides a comprehensive and diverse insight into a variety of areas, including in-depth studies of fiscal, monetary and voting issues, to help elucidate the current period of transitional change.
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Budgeting and public debt within a system of cooperative democracy

An Illusion of Democratic Political Economy

Giuseppe Eusepi and Richard E. Wagner

This chapter establishes an analytical benchmark of a democratic system in which political outcomes reflect genuine consensus among the participants. This benchmark traces to Antonio de Viti de Marco’s construction of contrasting models of democratic action. The theory of a wholly cooperative democratic regime provides a benchmark against which to examine actual democratic processes and arrangements. In this respect, and looking ahead, de Viti recognized that democratic regimes were not passive reflectors of individual preference orderings because they entailed relationships of domination and subordination.

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Public debt within systems of monopolistic democracy

An Illusion of Democratic Political Economy

Giuseppe Eusepi and Richard E. Wagner

This chapter modifies the benchmark condition of a cooperative democracy to incorporate a realistic treatment of democracy where there exist islands of political power within a relatively passive sea of generally modest democratic participation. This chapter explains that descriptions of democracy as entailing self-governance are typically mythical or ideological formulations that promote the purposes of those who work with such notions. Public debt becomes a form of shell game, the success of which depends on most people looking somewhere other than where the real action occurs, and which entails a shifting of cost from dominant to subordinate groups as covered by an ideology of self-governance.

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Giuseppe Eusepi and Richard E. Wagner

This chapter explores how public debt is a troubling practice for republican and democratic regimes because of its ability to corrupt the language and practice of political economy. For instance, the idea of contract is a perfectly good and sensible concept to apply to the private ordering of economic interaction. When that term is extended to public ordering outside the hypothetical construction of a cooperative state, it becomes a piece of ideology that obscures the role of public debt in promoting the interests of politically dominant groups within society.

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Public Debt

An Illusion of Democratic Political Economy

Giuseppe Eusepi and Richard E. Wagner

Over the past decades, economists have witnessed with growing uneasiness their failure to explain the ballooning of public debt in most countries. This book provides an alternative orientation that explains why concepts of public debt that are relevant for authoritarian regimes are not relevant for democratic regimes. Using methodological individualism and micro-economics, this book overcomes flaws inherent in the standard macro approach, according to which governments manipulate public debt to promote systemic stability. This unique analysis is grounded in the writings of Antonio de Viti de Marco, injecting current analytical contributions and formulations into the framework to offer a forthright insight into public debt and political economy.