The United States Congress is increasingly focused on reform to patent litigation to address the increased volume and high costs of patent cases, the supposedly bad actions of certain patentees (so-called ‘patent trolls’), and the perception that many patent cases are meritless and brought only to obtain cost-of-defense settlements. Some proposed reforms are properly tailored to address real problems in the patent system but many are unnecessary, unlikely to be effective because they fail to address underlying problems of substantive patent law, and/or likely to deter even meritorious assertions of patent rights. After providing an overview of proposed patent litigation reforms and their shortcomings, the chapter proposes a reform that is likely to be more effective and better tailored to addressing the problems motivating reform: staging litigation so that some patent issues are resolved in their entirety before there is any discovery or other litigation on other issues.
Anthony J. Nyberg and Greg Reilly
We propose a pay system model showing how three pay practice decisions – salary level, pay for performance (PFP) proportion, and the organizational level of PFP targets – affect human capital resources (HCRs) through sorting and incentive effects. The model also shows how the three pay practice decisions help utilize the HCR capacity to achieve desired outcomes. This addresses areas where research often underestimates the role that pay has in affecting the make-up or capacity of the HCR and the manner by which pay turns or enacts the HCR capacity into unit activity and performance.