This chapter discusses how to reconcile the need for a substantial reform of the framework of the European Union (EU) with the responsibility for country reforms. The issue is exemplified by means of a central fiscal risk-sharing instrument for the euro area (EA). The author argues that such a capacity would not necessarily create a super-state. It would be an overlay over the existing fiscal framework, completing it according to the distinct features of the monetary union as being a federation of single nation-states. Such a capacity would make the fiscal stipulations of the Maastricht Treaty more reliable. An assessment of various concepts by using the criteria of sovereignty, efficiency and effectiveness reveals the superiority of a stabilization fund against a full-fledged EA budget and a European Monetary Fund. With respect to the latter, it would unduly combine the stabilization and the disciplinary functions.
Kazimierz Łaski belonged to the group of economists who particularly clearly and convincingly criticized the application of neoliberal doctrines to the transition of socialist countries into market economies. His analysis of the transition agendas was deeply rooted in the Kaleckian tradition of reasoning and brought him much respect but also fierce opposition in the international arena. In answering the why and how of his work, this article will summarize his contributions to the economics and politics of transition.