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Ioannis G. Asimakopoulos

Within Banking Union, the Single Resolution Board (Board) was established as an EU agency with extensive decision-making powers both at the preventive phase of resolution planning and at the resolution phase itself, when a resolution scheme needs to be actually applied. Such powers can be directly addressed to credit institutions, circumventing the national resolution authorities. Many scholars have expressed their concerns as regards the Board’s compatibility with the current EU legal order. However, to conclude on its compatibility one needs to understand in depth the functions of the Board, especially owing to their highly technical nature. This paper aims to shed light on the unknown by conducting a competence-by-competence analysis of the Board’s powers, as well as examining the procedural safeguards that aim to mitigate these concerns, such as the role of the national resolution authorities and the Commission, the Board’s public interest assessment and the ‘no creditor worse-off’ principle.

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Katerina Pantazatou and Ioannis G. Asimakopoulos

The chapter begins with a description of the imperfect character of the EMU, one of the main components of the European Economic Constitution, and the crisis-induced mechanisms to address any ensuing external, asymmetrical shocks. In absence of monetary policy instruments at the national level, fiscal policies can become overwhelmed if country-specific shocks are very large and not well catered for by the shock-absorbing capacity of the economy and the financial sector. Hence, risk-sharing in the EMU takes place through two channels: the market channel and the fiscal channel. In particular, the second section examines the preventive and corrective fiscal rules, the third elaborates on the role that the European Stability Mechanism and the European Central Bank play in providing fiscal relief to Member States in need, and the fourth section analyses how the Banking Union is aimed to absorb fiscal imbalances rather than reinforce them. We then conclude.

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Katerina Pantazatou and Ioannis G. Asimakopoulos

Aikaterini Pantazatou and Ioannis Asimakopoulos overview the conventional and unconventional monetary policies that the ECB has deployed to pursue its mandate as the central bank of the Eurozone. The authors underline how the EU treaties assign to the ECB the primary task of maintaining price stability, and explain the traditional toolkit to achieve this goal, including interest rates changes, open market operations, standing facilities, i.e., the deposit and the marginal lending facilities, and minimum reserve requirements for credit institutions. At the same time, they underline how conventional monetary policy came under pressure in context of the euro-crisis, where interest rates policy reached its lower bound and the transmission of monetary policy came under pressure, forcing the ECB to develop new instruments, such as targeted long-term refinancing operations, securities market programme, outright monetary transactions (OMT) and - finally - public assets purchase programmes, otherwise known as quantitative easing (QE). As this chapter explains, the deployment of unconventional monetary policy confirms that the ECB enjoys powers analogous to other central banks, but also raises legal challenges to the ECB actions.