You are looking at 1 - 6 of 6 items

  • Author or Editor: Joseph Halevi x
Clear All Modify Search
You do not have access to this content

Joseph Halevi

In 2004 the author founded, and taught till retirement, the main second-year economic theory course at the newly established Department of Political Economy at the University of Sydney: Economic Theories of Modern Capitalism, code ECOP2011. The Department, which was formed in 2000, originated from a split within the traditional one in the 1970s. Although its main focus is on issues and not on analytical approaches to economics, its creation provided the opportunity for establishing a mainstay course based on a comprehensive historical and analytical view of economics from its modern inception.

You do not have access to this content

Joseph Halevi and Rééduane Taouil

You do not have access to this content

Riccardo Bellofiore and Joseph Halevi

You do not have access to this content

Riccardo Bellofiore, Joseph Halevi and Marco Passarella

You do not have access to this content

Geoffrey C. Harcourt, Peter Kriesler and Joseph Halevi

The question of central-bank independence (CBI) represents a major area of disagreement between mainstream and heterodox economists. For the mainstream, the question has been long settled in favour of independence. For many economists, the advantages of an independent central bank remain far from clear. Among the reasons, the authors argue that there are implications for democracy if one of the major instruments of government policy is under the control of an unelected, unrepresentative elite. Moreover, they ask why one would assume that the motivations of central bankers are, in some way, superior to those of elected politicians. In addition, the major justification for CBI is its impact on inflation, mainly via expectations. However, the transmission channel from expectations to inflation has not been properly analysed, and may, in fact, have no impact. Finally, serious economic policy requires a mixture of all policy options, including appropriate fiscal and monetary policy. In other words, monetary policy needs to be seen as part of a general policy package, not as an independent policy tool.