You are looking at 1 - 1 of 1 items

  • Author or Editor: Leslie M. Marx x
Clear All Modify Search
You do not have access to this content

Robert C. Marshall, Leslie M. Marx and Claudio Mezzetti

Once firms are prosecuted for collusion, strategies remain available that have the potential to reduce the penalties they face. Settlement negotiations offer opportunities to negotiate restricted pleas that limit penalties from follow-on litigation, and leniency programs such as Amnesty Plus offer opportunities to reduce fines associated with collusion in one product by revealing collusion in another. The authors offer implications for antitrust policy and consider firms’ strategies during settlement negotiations and leniency applications while these firms are being prosecuted for collusion. They discuss the effects of settlement negotiations on deterrence through such settlement negotiations on follow-on litigation and suggest that limited criminal pleas can handicap the ability of civil litigants to pursue damages and, hence, reduce deterrence. They show how leniency programs can affect incentives for multiproduct colluders, potentially decreasing deterrence in the main product market and creating incentives for the formation of sacrificial cartels in secondary product markets.