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Edited by Mervyn K. Lewis, Mohamed Ariff and Shamsher Mohamad

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Edited by Mervyn K. Lewis, Mohamed Ariff and Shamsher Mohamad

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Edited by Mervyn K. Lewis, Mohamed Ariff and Shamsher Mohamad

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Edited by Mervyn K. Lewis, Mohamed Ariff and Shamsher Mohamad

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Mohamed Ariff, Mervyn K. Lewis and Shamsher Mohamad

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Mohamed Ariff, Mervyn K. Lewis and Shamsher Mohamad

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Edited by Mervyn K. Lewis, Mohamed Ariff and Shamsher Mohamad

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Edited by Mervyn K. Lewis, Mohamed Ariff and Shamsher Mohamad

From a single product offering in 1963, the Islamic financial services industry has grown to an estimated $1.6 trillion in assets. Products must comply with profit and risk-sharing criteria and regulations preventing banks from venturing into activities with high risk and excessive uncertainty. This timely volume analyses these matters and considers the range of new products, discussing both conceptual and practical dimensions. It connects Islamic finance to the mainstream theoretical literature on financial intermediation while also exploring its differences. The expert contributors also examine why an ethical foundation is important and why the system requires well-thought-out regulations to ensure outcomes that protect the community’s well-being.
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The promise of public–private partnerships

Evaluating Public–Private Partnerships and Other Procurement Options

Darrin Grimsey and Mervyn K. Lewis

Public-private partnerships (PPPs) were prompted by dissatisfaction with the bureaucratic, dirigiste nature of public provision of infrastructure, and the belief that PPPs could combine the best features of private and public approaches. The chapter examines the mechanics of a PPP and three issues are addressed. One is what a PPP can and cannot do. It can bring private sector efficiency, regulation through competition, economic pricing of services, filter out ‘white elephants’, and free up public (that is, ‘free’) services, but cannot bring in additional finance for infrastructure except in the case of ‘user pays’ tolls and charges. A second issue is the theoretical basis of a PPP. Economic theory suggests that performance differences relative to traditional procurement lie in ownership rights, the bundling of construction and operation into a single contract, and the transfer of risks of design, construction overruns and time delays to the private body. Finally, the third aspect examined concerns the criticisms surrounding PPPs. These arise from refinancing, the drag on government budgets from the unitary charge, incomplete (or no substantive) risk transfer from the public purse, the public’s access rights to tolled facilities, the difficulties of allowing for technological change over the lengthy and inflexible contracts, the significant procurement costs involved in PPP projects and their potential to be ‘gamed’ by some participants (including public sector procurers).

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Implementing a partnership agenda

Evaluating Public–Private Partnerships and Other Procurement Options

Darrin Grimsey and Mervyn K. Lewis

The public sector traditionally has obtained new assets (roads, bridges, schools, hospitals, buildings, and so on) separately from the associated services. A partnership agenda offers a different approach because the acquisition of infrastructure assets and associated services is accomplished with one long-term contract. Due to this bundling, before the contract can be put out to tender, decisions need to be made up front about who is responsible for what, and what to include or leave out: Services. What are the ‘core’ services that must be delivered by the facility? What are the non-core services? Finance. Who is best positioned to provide the finance? How quickly and at what cost could private finance be raised? Would it be quicker and less costly for the government itself to undertake the financing? Risks. What are the project risks? Which ones should be transferred contractually to the private party, or retained by the public sector or shared? How is uncertainty to be handled? Public interest. Are the public likely to get good value for money from the PPP? Do the outcomes satisfy the public interest test? These questions frame the content of the chapter along with some issues that have surfaced recently, namely commissioning and contestability, evidence on value for money, the relative cost of government and private finance, prompted by the argument that suppliers of private finance have greater, not less, ability to diversify risks than taxpayers.