Norris Krueger brings pedagogy to life in this insightful chapter. Importantly, Krueger demonstrates his interest is equally applied to both inputs and outputs, that is, learning aims, activities and assessment of the desired learning. The breadth of Krueger’s experiences cannot be captured here, but his powerful advocating for problem-based learning is both logical and compelling. Krueger offers a preview of the influence of the cognitive sciences in EE, and the deeper level of strategising it will entail. Krueger speaks of two changes coming to EE, increased excellence in teaching and greater integration of neuroscience to guide our pedagogical practice. Overall, Krueger expresses considerable optimism for the direction of change in EE, much of it driven by his very own efforts.
Norris Krueger and Isabell Welpe
Gabi A. Kaffka and Norris Krueger
Cognitive differences at the individual level may determine how entrepreneurs execute entrepreneurial tasks (Forbes, 2005). Extant studies have focused mainly on the consequences of entrepreneurs possessing and leveraging particular cognitive abilities (Grégoire et al., 2011). Meanwhile, the mere performance of entrepreneurial action has an effect on an entrepreneur’s cognition, whether it be decision-making under uncertainty, pattern recognition or prototype building (Baron and Ensley, 2006; McMullen and Shepherd, 2006; McKelvie et al., 2011), drawing attention to the cause of entrepreneurial cognitive development. This cause versus consequence focus is described as an enduring conundrum within the entrepreneurial cognition literature (Grégoire et al., 2011). To address this conundrum researchers have called for more attention to be paid to dynamic processes related to entrepreneurial cognition (Mitchell et al., 2011), such as the role of third parties as these affect the development of entrepreneurial cognition (Ozgen and Baron, 2007). Recognizant of the role of the social context in entrepreneurial cognition, Mitchell et al. (2011) conceptualized entrepreneurial cognition as socially situated. Socially situated cognition (SSC) sees cognition as action-orientated, embodied, situated and distributed. Socially situated cognition emphasizes the distributed nature of cognitive development, namely, other actors as sources of information and knowledge who can be leveraged in respect of that (Haynie et al., 2010; Dew et al., 2015).
Olga Belousova, Aard Groen and Norris Krueger
Corporate entrepreneurship (CE) is commonly understood as a process that allows established companies to extend and reorient profiles of their activities, entering new markets and creating new businesses. One of the most seminal definitions of CE describes it as a process whereby an individual or a group of individuals, in association with an existing organization, create a new organization or instigate renewal or innovation within that organization (Sharma and Chrisman, 1999). The CE process is believed to possess the following specific properties. First, CE is based on new resource combinations and extension of the existing competencies (Birkinshaw, 1997; Burgelman, 1983a; Covin and Miles, 1999). Second, it often requires a departure from the existing practices and the ability of a firm to acquire innovative skills and capabilities (Birkinshaw, 1997; Burgelman, 1983a; Covin and Slevin, 1991; Floyd and Wooldridge, 1999; Hornsby et al., 2002). Finally, while Vesper (1984), Carrier (1996) and Birkinshaw (1997) draw our attention to the role of employee’s initiative, Pinchot (1985) further introduces the notion of responsibility, and Chung and Gibbons (1997) suggest that CE activity is a collective action. Hence, the main characteristics of the process of CE are the use of internal resources (slack, saved or generated), enlargement of the competencies base of the company into new business areas, acquisition of new knowledge and skills to enter these areas, and the initiative of employees (individually or in group) who take responsibility for the project.
Malin Brännback, Alan L. Carsrud and Norris Krueger
If we are to improve our understanding of the role of intentions in start-up teams of entrepreneurs and family firm succession, we need move to beyond the traditional view of individual intentions in entrepreneurial settings and toward understanding collective intentions. For example, in a start-up there is often a small group whose individual intentions for entering the firm and setting its strategic direction must blend to some form of consensus such as marketing and growth strategy. Very often the conflict of early intentions to enter and operate a firm by a team has been ignored in favor of just looking at the intentions of a single entrepreneur to start a firm, failing to recognize that this is often not just an individual decision, but one impacting the family of the entrepreneur as well. Thus, other people’s intentions can come into play with respect to the intention to start a new firm. In addition, in a family firm the intentions toward succession is as much collective as individual. If we seek we-intent to increase the possibility of successful succession, then a focus on “we” intentions allows for a better understand of the potentially conflicting intentions of key individuals. A CEO of a family firm may intend individually that a child will succeed them in the leadership of the firm. A potential conflicting intention would be the child having no intention to take over the firm. “We” intentions occur when a shared intention is reached. For example, the CEO and the child agree the child should go to work for another firm before a decision is made about the firm’s leadership succession. Although the topic of succession has been widely examined, it has always been from either the factors that influence a successor or the career choice intentions of the successor, or the individual intentions of the parent being succeeded. This chapter argues that the conceptualization of collective intent such as “we-intentions” from Bagozzi offers a better understanding of group processes from a social cognition perspective, especially those of succession. However, collective intentions (and their measurement) are still less understood. In turn, this suggests that family firms (and especially succession) might be ideal test beds for rigorous testing of models and measures of collective intent.