Existing public funding for biodiversity conservation is widely acknowledged to be inadequate to finance the actions required to meet the EU’s biodiversity conservation targets, contributing to the global targets set by the Convention on Biological Diversity. Consequently, access to funding from other sectoral funding streams of the public domain, including through new and innovative means, is needed both in order to close the funding gap for biodiversity and to internalise the costs of conservation into sectoral activities that drive biodiversity loss. Environmental fiscal reform is considered to create several opportunities for complementing and mobilising resources for biodiversity funding. Environmental taxes, which either directly or indirectly support biodiversity, biodiversity-related environmental fees and charges (e.g. hunting charges and nature park entrance fees), and environmental tax relief mechanisms that reward certain biodiversity-friendly activities or behaviour are examples of fiscal instruments that can be used to mobilise more funding for biodiversity. Furthermore, redistributing tax revenue among government levels according to ecological criteria (i.e. ecological fiscal transfers) can also be used to support the delivery of conservation objectives. All of these instruments have so far not been widely explored in the EU and its Member States but have a potential to complement the existing policy mix for biodiversity finance. This chapter provides a review of these fiscal instruments, highlighting a number of successful examples, and explores their possible role within the context of the overall framework for biodiversity financing.
Exploring the policy mix for biodiversity financing: opportunities provided by environmental fiscal instruments in the EU
Carbon Taxes, Energy Subsidies and Smart Instrument Mixes
Andrea Illes, Marianne Kettunen, Patrick ten Brink, Rui Santos, Nils Droste and Irene Ring
Patrick ten Brink, Leonardo Mazza, Tomáš Badura, Marianne Kettunen and Sirini Withana
Patrick ten Brink, Markus Lehmann, Bettina Kretschmer, Stehanie Newman and Leonardo Mazza
By adopting the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011-2020, Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) in 2010 committed to eliminate, phase out or reform incentives (including subsidies) that have harmful effects on biodiversity by 2020 at the latest. This task is a Herculean one, and not just because of their prevalence. As subsidies and other market distortions that result in harmful incentives are an integral part of the policy landscape, they are frequently difficult to identify, isolate, and remove. It is also a Sisyphean task: in an ever-changing policy landscape, new subsidies are frequently introduced, and new evidence about their impacts is continually cropping up. Sometimes it is only when combinations of policies and programmes are taken together do they generate harmful environmental effects, such as the incentives for urban sprawl or for biofuels. In some instances, even the combinations of programmes may not be the only cause of the problem. Such features add to the complexity in identifying and addressing harmful incentives. This chapter explores what types of subsidies have negative impacts on biodiversity. It looks at positive incentive measures for biodiversity and explores the relationship between harmful and positive incentives. Finally, it explores what needs to be done to realise the commitment of the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity, building on positive case examples of successful reforms.
Sirini Withana, Patrick ten Brink, Leonardo Mazza and Daniela Russi
A broad definition of environmentally harmful subsidies (EHS) encompasses 'hidden' or implicit subsidies that result from a lack of full cost pricing for the provision of goods and services, lack of resource pricing and non-internalization of externalities. These subsidies can arise due to explicit decisions such as choosing a policy of only partial cost recovery. They can also be due to a lack of actions such as the regulation or taxation of pollution to internalize externalities or putting in place charges that would reflect resource values. Although such a broad definition can lead to difficulties in measuring the scale of subsidies involved, it is important to recognize that such perverse incentives exist and can be quite significant in several sectors. Some may opt to recognize these as subsidies, while others prefer to use the term de facto or implicit subsidies or even refer to them as incentives. This chapter will examine cases of implicit subsidies due to the lack of full cost pricing, including for water, sub-soil assets and fisheries resources, as well as implicit subsidies arising from the non-internalization of externalities. It will provide an overview of these issues and provide examples of their consequences in terms of pollution and overuse of scarce resources in different countries. In addition, it will examine experiences in identifying and addressing such implicit environmentally harmful subsidies that can serve as examples to others considering reform.
Patrick ten Brink, Marina Morère and Jane Wallace-Jones
Patrick ten Brink, Sirini Withana and Frans Oosterhuis
There is a growing list of commitments to reform environmental harmful subsidies from the global to the local level. Although public statements of the urgency for subsidy reform and declarations of commitment to such reforms have been increasing, progress to date has been relatively slight, with several notable exceptions. There is a new consensus that the conditions necessary for subsidy reform are increasingly aligned - a growing realization of resource scarcity, an appreciation of environmental and health impacts and a need for fiscal consolidation - creating a range of windows of opportunity between now and 2020 for EHS reform. This chapter presents guidelines to support countries in the identification of EHS, prioritization for reform and principles to guide the reform process. Subsidies are an integral part of political economy and current weaknesses in their design are undermining the potential for the transition to a green economy. There is a need for a systematic approach to address this systemic problem - both by reforming existing subsidies and correctly designing new subsidies for tomorrow's priorities.
Sirini Withana and Patrick ten Brink
Frans Oosterhuis and Patrick ten Brink
The most ancient term of constitution is the Greek word "________"_established on the basis of the constitutionalist experience of the ancient Greek peoples and representing a kind of constitutional concept of "Inter-sub-ject relationships"_Afterwards the terms for constitution evolved based on the clue of Ancient Greek thought. The Greek word "________" was Latinized by Cicero, who objectified the concept of constitution as rules of public affairs. Cicero also made two phrases of rei publicae status and rei publicae constitutio to express constitution, andset the word of status and the word of constitutio to substitute each other. Thomas Aquinas used ordinatio civi-tatis, ordo civitatis and regimen to explain Arislotle's concept of constitution, and reduced its meaning of "inter-subject relationships" to "class relationships"_After the nation-state period, the words for constitution in many national languages emerged_such as lois fondamentales, loi politique, constitution, Verfassung, etc. They reflect the political reality of territory-nation state, which is different from the political reality of city-state reflected by ancient constitutions. As there_many words for express constitution in history, it is ex parte to only focus on the word "constitution" in researching the history of terminology of constitution in western languages.