Peter G. Klein
This chapter utilizes the economic theory of organizations to provide an analysis of central banking and the U.S. Federal Reserve System. Challenges to independent central banking systems such as information issues regarding the optimal quantity of money for society and bureaucratic issues are explored. The role and performance of the Federal Reserve leading up to the Great Recession and during the aftermath are assessed. Federal Reserve independence and power are explored. The chapter debates the need for a central bank, ultimately concluding with a discussion of alternatives to the current state of central banking. Keywords: Monetary policy, Federal Reserve, entrepreneurship
Peter G. Klein and Sandra K. Klein
Nicolai J. Foss and Peter G. Klein
Peter G. Klein and Thomas A. Lambert
This chapter applies Austrian insights relevant to analysis of American business law. Modern corporation and partnership law, perhaps surprisingly, largely coheres with an Austrian theory of the firm, although recent regulations affecting corporate conduct and securities offerings, enacted in the wake of financial scandals, undermine these principles. On the other hand, antitrust law operates under a static view of markets that is inconsistent with Austrian principles, although recent antitrust decisions have been more consistent. We set forth aspects of Austrian thought most relevant to an analysis of American business law. We have shown that this rich body of thought that has proven so useful in analyses of institutions (e.g., the Socialist Calculation debate) and monetary and fiscal policies (e.g., Austrian business cycle theory) has much to offer in the economic analysis of specific legal rules.