This chapter will argue that the period of conflict following the December 2013 violence in Juba, which began with a schism in the ruling Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), can only be understood when viewed in light of wider sources of conflict in Sudan. It will demonstrate that what is particularly interesting about South Sudan’s ‘post-conflict’ transition is the extent to which the regime really has not changed. Continuities with previous modes of governance and the centralisation of power within the ranks of the SPLM have meant that there is more in common with previous regimes than there has been change. The origins of this conflict can be traced to structural and institutional legacies that have persisted from colonial rule. The chapter outlines the history of conflict in Sudan, before focusing on the six-year transition period that followed the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005. The issues left unresolved during the transition and the modes of governance established then tell us much about why South Sudan has returned to civil war. The chapter highlights questions of the administrative and political legacies of colonial rule; the SPLM/A’s transition from a rebel movement to a governing party; the problems of militarization, especially combined with the mobilisation of ethnicity; and the role of international actors, especially non-governmental organisations.
Róisín Read and Roger Mac Ginty
This chapter interrogates at the issue time and international intervention. Specifically, it makes the case that time is an imaginary that is socially constructed by actors with the power to do so. The chapter considers the construction and framing of 'crises' and how the framing of urgency and necessity is often used to justify intervention and the role of intervening parties. Just as empowered actors can designate what constitutes a crisis, they also seek to identify suitable timeframes for an exit from the intervention site. The chapter is sceptical of the notion of exit, however, and argues that the complex nature of international intervention, and its socio-economic and political implications for both the intervener and the intervened, means that there can be no definitive terminal moment of exit.