There is a tendency to see Indian Currency and Finance as anticipating Keynes’s later work on international monetary issues, including his proposals for the Bretton Woods conference. This chapter argues, however, that such continuities as there may appear to be are purely technical, relating to the ideas and methods of managing money, and are not original to Keynes’s economic thinking. On the other hand, a vast political chasm and thirty years separate these two endeavours. This chapter demonstrates now unoriginal the common technical elements of these two sets of work were while also showing how politically different they were. In this way, the chapter seeks to provide an appreciation of just how great a distance Keynes travelled from his Marshallian convictions of his earliest days to the critical account of capitalism he eventually arrived at.
This chapter argues that Marxist economics cannot explain the present crisis because, as a discipline, it is not geared to. It is an oxymoron attempting fit Marxism to the methodological frame of marginalist neoclassical economics. The latter is antithetical to Marxism because it is ahistorical. In place of Marxist economics, this chapter proposes a geopolitical economy which exploits the resources of the historical the traditions of classical political economy and the critics of neoclassical economics in a way that enables us to view the present crisis in its historical and world perspective. It proceeds by first outlining a critique of Marxist economics and follows it up with a discussion of the variety of forms of capitalist crises. These discussions clear the ground for a historical view of value production and an understanding of the drivers of its own history. A full account of the present crisis being impossible here, the chapter closes with sketches of how geopolitical economy would approach two key elements of it: consumption demand and international capital flows.