This Chapter addresses the question why international actors would opt for more informal settings and output and what the consequences of this choice are in terms of elements that are traditionally perceived as being weak in traditional law, such as legitimacy and compliance. This question relates to the choice for a certain governance arrangement. As this is not a legal question per se, this Chapter uses insights offered by other disciplines to shed some more light on this choice. It will make an attempt to contribute to the debate by pointing to the choice of States (or other actors in the public sphere) to move from formal to informal international decision-making as well as to some consequences of this choice. What will be termed a ‘turn to informality’ will be first of all be approached theoretically by assessing reasons for actors to choose certain governance arrangements. Using a social science approach, these theoretical assumptions will then be assessed in the framework of a case study on the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) when dealing with the regulatory governance of nanotechnologies. This Chapter could also be seen as a plea for new approaches linking theoretical analysis and empirical studies in international institutional law. The turn to informality in the real world can only lead to an acceptance in international legal scholarship when empirical findings and insights from social sciences are taken on board.
Ramses A. Wessel and Evisa Kica
Knud Erik Jørgensen and Ramses A. Wessel
Ramses A. Wessel
While over the past years lawmaking by international organizations has received abundant attention, institutional lawmaking has moved beyond the traditional methods and actors and is increasingly studied in a broader sense, including new actors and new regulatory activities. This chapter approaches institutional lawmaking with these developments in mind. It assesses the lawmaking functions of traditional international organizations and will also further clarify the notion of institutional lawmaking itself. It focuses on possible lawmaking functions of other international bodies and in doing so will point to the wide variety of bodies and networks active in lawmaking processes. The main argument is that different international norms originating in distinct formal and informal bodies and networks are interconnected and together form a global normative web. Implicitly, this calls for a broader understanding of institutional lawmaking to allow us to take full account of a rich institutional normative output but also of a complex relation between different norms.
Ramses A. Wessel
EU cybersecurity forms a prime example of an area in which both internal and external (global as well as bilateral) policies are connected and in which the different legal competences of the Union need to be combined. Over the past decade the European Union started to take its first careful steps in formulating and regulating this new policy area, starting mainly from an ‘outside-in’ perspective in which global security threats triggered internal policies. With the adoption of the 2013 Strategy it aims to bring the different earlier initiatives together in a comprehensive fashion while pointing to new legislative plans, which also reflect a wish to act as a global player and a participant in the formulation of new global rules. European cybersecurity policy is formulated and implemented in a multi-level and multi-stakeholder structure, in which legislation is connected to both international developments and domestic implementation in the EU Member States and where both public and private actors play a role. In an exploratory fashion, this chapter assesses both the existing and emerging internal rules related to cybersecurity as well as the EU’s contribution to the development of a global regulatory framework.