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Raymond E. Levitt and Kent Eriksson

Australia has been a pioneer in using public_private partnership (PPP) delivery of infrastructure for the past three decades and has accumulated a great deal of experience – both good and bad – that has helped to refine its governance regimes on both the public and the private sides of PPP delivery. This chapter reports findings from a set of interviews with all the key participants in PPP delivery about how government legislators and executive agencies currently prioritize projects professionally to avoid typical legislative parochialism in authorizing locally favored infrastructure projects, and how they organize the regulatory framework and agencies for PPP delivery. It then describes the governance regimes that have evolved for minimizing and addressing conflicts of interest and opportunistic behavior by and within the private sector concessionaires’ project companies that finance, deliver and operate PPP infrastructure services in mature Australian federal and state PPP markets. Countries considering or beginning to use infrastructure delivery can learn valuable lessons about governing this mode of infrastructure service delivery in the public interest from how Australia has adapted its governance mechanisms and safeguards for PPP delivery.

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Edited by Raymond E. Levitt, W. R. Scott and Michael J. Garvin

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W. Richard Scott, Raymond E. Levitt and Michael J. Garvin

We do not subscribe to a goal of unconstrained development for its own sake; but assuring an adequate supply of civic infrastructure (including housing, roads and public transport, power, water supply and sanitation) is essential to meet the needs of developing countries where populations are growing and becoming more urbanized, as well as those of developed countries where infrastructure is aging and in need of repair and/or replacement. Important as it is, however, providing the necessary infrastructure confronts severe difficulties. Governments of emerging market countries face enormous shortfalls in financial and governance capacity in delivering sorely needed new infrastructure for their growing populations. At the same time, financially strapped governments of mature market economies are struggling to upgrade and retrofit their aging and obsolete infrastructure. Societies at both ends of the development spectrum need more robust project governance structures that can enable new forms of financing coupled with improved systems of managerial oversight and control. Infrastructure is central to societal welfare, and the high cost of replicating the “last mile of pipe or wire” often requires a monopolistic state provision or regulated private provision strategy. We would thus ordinarily expect that the state would play a major role in its prioritization, funding, development and operation. However, historically this has not always been the case. Specific countries vary in their experience, but the United States (US) is not atypical. As Miller and Floricel (2000) point out, during much of the nineteenth century US transportation systems and power networks were built by private entrepreneurs, with minimal public involvement. Toward the end of the century, large corporate groups replaced the entrepreneurs but still experienced only modest public oversight. However, during the Progressive era of the early twentieth century, private initiatives were increasingly regulated and, over time, nationalized as public enterprises. For the greater part of the century, federal, state and local authorities planned, funded, built and operated the bulk of infrastructure. However, during the 1980s, buoyed by a more conservative political wave, calls intensified for the privatization of these enterprises. From that period to the present, varying combinations of private and public entities have partnered to provide these facilities and services.

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Edited by Raymond E. Levitt, W. R. Scott and Michael J. Garvin

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Witold J. Henisz, Raymond E. Levitt and W. Richard Scott

To confront the extreme governance challenges posed by large, multi-phased infrastructure projects, the authors propose the application of a theoretical framework to construct a structure composed of regulative, normative and cognitive elements. The right combination of these institutional elements can allow participants to counteract problems such as displaced or “broken” agency _ in which later participants suffer from agreements crafted by earlier decision-makers holding different interests _ contracts that are overly rigid or brittle, and the absence of a shared purpose or mission. Sociological, political and psychological concepts and arguments are employed to supplement the economic and legal perspectives now dominating project governance. The harnessing of practices such as relational contracting, work group norms, network systems of decision-making, reputational capital, procedural justice and shared identities can lead the way toward crafting a more flexible, robust and effective governance structure.

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Edited by Raymond E. Levitt, W. R. Scott and Michael J. Garvin

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Edited by Raymond E. Levitt, W. R. Scott and Michael J. Garvin

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Edited by Raymond E. Levitt, W. R. Scott and Michael J. Garvin

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Edited by Raymond E. Levitt, W. R. Scott and Michael J. Garvin

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Public–Private Partnerships for Infrastructure Development

Finance, Stakeholder Alignment, Governance

Edited by Raymond E. Levitt, W. R. Scott and Michael J. Garvin

Large infrastructure projects often face significant cost overruns and stakeholder fragmentation. Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) allow governments to procure long-term infrastructure services from private providers, rather than developing, financing, and managing infrastructure assets themselves. Aligning public and private interests and institutional logics for decades-long service contracts subject to shifting economic and political contexts creates significant governance challenges. We integrate multiple theoretical perspectives with empirical evidence to examine how experiences from more mature PPP jurisdictions can help improve PPP governance approaches worldwide.