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Susan Rose-Ackerman, Stefanie Egidy and James Fowkes

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Introduction

Second Edition

Susan Rose-Ackerman, Peter L. Lindseth and Blake Emerson

This volume, like the first edition, attempts to capture the complexity of the field of comparative administrative law while distilling certain key elements for further study. Part I concentrates on the relationship between administrative and constitutional law—uncertain, contested, and deeply essential. Part II focuses on a key aspect of government structure—administrative independence with its manifold implications for separation of powers, democratic self-government, and the boundary between law, politics, and policy. Next, Part III highlights the tensions between impartial expertise and public accountability, especially when the executive and independent agencies make general policies. Part IV discusses administrative litigation and the role of the courts in reviewing both individual decisions and secondary norms (‘rules’ in US parlance). Part V considers how administrative law is shaping and is being shaped by the changing boundaries of the state. Part V.A considers the shifting boundary between the public and the private sectors, and part V.B concentrates explicitly on the European Union and its complex relationship with the Member States.

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Edited by Susan Rose-Ackerman, Peter L. Lindseth and Blake Emerson

A comprehensive overview of the field of comparative administrative law that builds on the first edition with many new and revised chapters, additional topics and extended geographical coverage. This Research Handbook’s broad, multi-method approach combines history and social science with more strictly legal analyses. This new edition demonstrates the growth and dynamism of recent efforts – spearheaded by the first edition – to stimulate comparative research in administrative law and public law more generally, reaching across different countries and scholarly disciplines.
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Edited by Susan Rose-Ackerman and Paul Lagunes

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Greed, Corruption, and the Modern State

Essays in Political Economy

Edited by Susan Rose-Ackerman and Paul Lagunes

What makes the control of corruption so difficult and contested? Drawing on the insights of political science, economics and law, the expert contributors to this book offer diverse perspectives. One group of chapters explores the nature of corruption in democracies and autocracies, and “reforms” that are mere facades. Other contributions examine corruption in infrastructure, tax collection, cross-border trade, and military procurement. Case studies from various regions – such as China, Peru, South Africa and New York City – anchor the analysis with real-world situations. The book pays particular attention to corruption involving international business and the domestic regulation of foreign bribery.
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Edited by Susan Rose-Ackerman and Tina Søreide

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Edited by Susan Rose-Ackerman and Tina Søreide

A companion volume to the International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption published in 2006, the specially commissioned papers in Volume Two present some of the best policy-oriented research in the field. They stress the institutional roots of corruption and include new research on topics ranging from corruption in regulation and procurement to vote buying and private firm payoffs.
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Tina Søreide and Susan Rose-Ackerman

Fighting corruption requires careful analyses of its underlying causes and consequences. This chapter provides an economic analysis of corruption as a trade in decisions that should not be for sale. The size of the bribe and the consequences of corruption are functions of the bargaining powers of those involved. We suggest ways to re-organize decision-making procedures to reduce the risks of corruption but stress the difficulty of breaking up entrenched collusive environments. Furthermore, even if corruption in a public institution is well recognized, it may not be possible to identify individual offenders. The question then is whether one should sanction the entire public body. Like private entities, public institutions can be encouraged to self-police and self-report (for example upon information from a whistleblower) if such steps will reduce the extent of some penalty. However, the criminal and administrative monetary sanctions applied to private sector entities are a poor fit for state institutions with on-going responsibilities to the citizenry. We propose non-monetary penalties, including intensified external monitoring, reorganization of authority, disqualification of leaders, and the removal of service provision responsibilities.

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Edited by Susan Rose-Ackerman and Peter L. Lindseth

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Susan Rose-Ackerman and Peter L. Lindseth