Edited by Susan Rose-Ackerman
Administrative government complicates the question of democratic legitimacy by moving policymaking outside both the electoral process and the legislative chamber. Given the practical requirement of delegating policymaking and implementation to the executive in a modern regulatory-welfare state, how can democratic values be preserved when decisions require expertise and officials must make decisions quickly in a rapidly changing environment? This chapter concentrates on the connections between expertise and public participation in the production of public policy. It unpacks the concept of public participation and the way it can affect policymaking and implementation choices, for good or for ill. It then concentrates on a specific case, the German Energiewende that aims to increase the generation of electric power from renewables at the same time as it phases out nuclear power. The German case demonstrates that public involvement is not per se desirable but must be organized to complement expertise and enhance democratic accountability. The chapter links to Rose-Ackerman’s broader research agenda in comparative administrative law.
Edited by Susan Rose-Ackerman and Tina Søreide
Tina Søreide and Susan Rose-Ackerman
Fighting corruption requires careful analyses of its underlying causes and consequences. This chapter provides an economic analysis of corruption as a trade in decisions that should not be for sale. The size of the bribe and the consequences of corruption are functions of the bargaining powers of those involved. We suggest ways to re-organize decision-making procedures to reduce the risks of corruption but stress the difficulty of breaking up entrenched collusive environments. Furthermore, even if corruption in a public institution is well recognized, it may not be possible to identify individual offenders. The question then is whether one should sanction the entire public body. Like private entities, public institutions can be encouraged to self-police and self-report (for example upon information from a whistleblower) if such steps will reduce the extent of some penalty. However, the criminal and administrative monetary sanctions applied to private sector entities are a poor fit for state institutions with on-going responsibilities to the citizenry. We propose non-monetary penalties, including intensified external monitoring, reorganization of authority, disqualification of leaders, and the removal of service provision responsibilities.