Although constitutional law often occupies the pride of place in public law discussions, this chapter argues along many dimensions, administrative law can be considered more constitutional in character than constitutions. It is both more reflective of local preferences and values, and also often superior in terms of limiting government behavior. It is also, in many contexts, more stable and enduring than are written constitutions. Paying attention to comparative administrative law as a feature of the unwritten constitution of nation-states helps to expose the limits of constitutions as regulatory devices.

There are various different approaches in the literature to conceptualizing and measuring the rule of law.  In this contribution we compare various approaches and identify relevant measures. We find strong correlations among them, notwithstanding very different approaches to conceptualization. This itself raises a puzzle about what is driving the convergence.  We find that all the measures are highly correlated with corruption indices, suggesting that the convergence is driven by a common third factor.  Following Rothstein (2014), we argue that the rule of law indicators  capture a more encompassing concept of impartial administration.  The chapter thus critiques the rule of law measurement enterprise as insufficiently linked to the underlying normative concept.