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Patrick A. McNutt

. ANTITRUST AND THE REGULATED FIRM There are two main bodies of thought on deregulation: public interest theory, where deregulation can be analysed in terms of the changes (increases) in net economic welfare; and public choice theory, where producers, regulators and consumers try to maximise real income or economic rent of their respective groups. The economic theory for government intervention has been couched in the debate on a natural monopoly, and whether or not it is socially efficient to have only one fIrm in the industry, even if it is only to reduce duplication of

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Zeljko Sevic

et al., 1996; 1997). The central bank as an institution has a particularly interesting history. Central bank: history and its (natural) development When the first central banks or, more correctly, government-sponsored banks, were incorporated, such as the Swedish Riksbank and the Bank of England, in 1668 and 1694, respectively, they were entrusted with a monopoly over money issuing in the metropolitan area or in a part of the country. In the majority of cases the central bank, for a while, was the only joint-stock bank in the country. Usually, this market advantage

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Helge Peukert

. In 1857, he began to study financial, state and administrative law at the University of Tubingen as the start of a career as a civil servant. Furthermore, he attended lectures in philosophy, history (under Duncker) and even the natural sciences (for his biographical background, see Balabkins, 1988, chs 1-4; Kaufhold, 1988). The combination of economics (called ‘national economics’ at the time) and history is already manifest in his first major scientific undertaking ‘Untersuchungder volkswirtschaftlichenAnschauungen zur Reformationszeit’, written in 1860. It is a

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Arno Mong Daastöl

, institutions, private versus public interest and historical stage of development). In particular, this concerned the difference between private versus public interest, between commodities and refined goods and the level 375 376 The Elgar companion to law and economics of development of a nation in all respects. Thereby Smith could overlook the necessity of installing an active government that would create a policy that differentiates, and therefore would defend the macro point of interest, by establishing regulations and legal arrangements, nationally and internationally

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Svetozar Pejovich and Enrico Colombatto

writing after the fact by friends and foes and should be taken cautiously. The process of ratification The economic functions of the constitution 69 of the Constitution was, however, quite interesting and uncertain until the very end.2 The following three quotations from the Declaration of Independence define the vision of the Founding Fathers upon which the United States Constitution rests: We hold these truths to be self-evident tell us that the Founding Fathers adhered to the tradition of natural law. The consent of the governed means that the Founding

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Patrick A. McNutt

to ask: why not trust the rich individual to redistribute £100 to the poor individual? Equivalent to an effective tax rate of 10 per cent, a fact-finder would apply a calculus to the likely disincentive effect of such a rate weighed against the moral hazard of the poor individual, whom in the knowledge of a certain sum of £100 would be less inclined to work and earn in order to subsist. So why redistribute at all? Does it deter stealing? Some may argue that stealing is morally wrong for the rich man and sometimes morally right for the poor man, because the

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Patrick A. McNutt

then has to balance the interests of an incumbent versus an entrant or a complainant versus a defendant. The approach relegates rights to the attainment of the public interest. It may be in the public interest to facilitate entry, notwithstanding the harm caused to the incumbent. No matter how great this harm, it does not give the incumbent the right to prevent or retard entry. However, it may be in their interests to do so, and public choice scholars refer to this as 'rent-seeking' (McNutt, 2002; Tullock, 1989). Therefore, the regulator in setting policy should be

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Margaret Brinig

severed. Grandparents, for example, are litigating to keep visitation rights at an ever-increasing rate, as are foster parents, natural siblings of the adopted child and even birth mothers (Brinig, 1996). Some of this litigation is no doubt produced by the monitoring problems Weiss and Willis (1985) discuss. Some may be simply an attempt to preserve the family franchise: the reputation and other assets of the extended relationship (Brinig, 1996). References Allen, Douglas (1990), ‘An Inquiry Into the State’s Role in Marriage’, Journal o Economic f Behavior and

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Heinz Grossekettler

schools up to the 1930s, so that jurists and economists were able to draw heavily on both law and economics (Backhaus, 1996a, p. 459). As a result, ‘a generation before the American Bar Association and the American Economic Association decided to come together to devote themselves to the economic analysis of antitrust law, this kind of 296 The Elgar companion to law and economics cooperation was perfectly natural at the University of Freiburg (. ..) where jurists and political economists taught and did research together in the thirties’ (Moschel, 1985, p. 45). It was

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Patrick A. McNutt

caring defendant. The defendant receives an endowment Wo and WI and we have an interest rate factor p such that: (7.2) With a budget constraint: (7.3) For the defendant compensation at time period to before any crime is committed must exceed any estimate opportunity cost accruing to not committing a crime as measured by the worth of the crime wo: Co (t) > Wo This inequality indicates how much 'crime' as a commodity is worth to a potential criminal. Within the economic model the objective is to find an expression for C 1(t+l) expressed as a measure of the future