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Edited by Frédérique Six and Koen Verhoest

Within political and administrative sciences generally, trust as a concept is contested, especially in the field of regulatory governance. This groundbreaking book is the first to systematically explore the role and dynamics of trust within regulatory regimes.
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Frédérique Six and Koen Verhoest

1. Trust in regulatory regimes: scoping the field Frédérique Six and Koen Verhoest This edited volume is the first endeavour to systematically investigate the role of trust in the different relations within regulatory regimes. Academics as far back as John Locke have argued that trust is the bond of society or a lubricant for social relations. So it would seem logical to assume that it also plays this role within regulatory regimes. But within public administration and political science in general, trust is a concept whose role is contested. Authors such as

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Frédérique Six and Koen Verhoest

9. An agenda for further research into the role of trust in regulatory regimes Frédérique Six and Koen Verhoest The chapters in this edited volume all address one or more of the gaps in our knowledge identified in the literature review presented in the introductory chapter. In this final chapter we take stock of what we now know about the role of trust in regulatory regimes and present an agenda for further research. This agenda follows the five themes identified in the introductory chapter: 1) there are outstanding issues for most trust relations within

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Betsy Carter

rigidities—and a producer refusal to follow the market—becomes a source of producer strength rather than weakness. France and Italy have nearly identical private wine regulatory regimes— the Italian DOC system (denominazione di origine controllata 1963) was directly modeled on the successful French AOC (appellation d’origine 115 M4123-SIX_TEXT (v2).indd 115 14/12/2016 11:43 116 Trust in regulatory regimes contrôlée 1935) classification system. Both systems claim to protect terroir, a delimited area with a distinct cultural heritage and geographic characteristics. The

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Lovisa Näslund and Kristina Tamm Hallström

supplement interpersonal trust in networks (Sydow and Windeler, 2003). This ability to instil trust furthermore depends not only on the trustworthiness of the norms and rules of the organization, but also in their ability to engage in and influence the sense-­making process of the actors it interacts with (Fuglsang and Jagd, 2015; Weber and Glynn, 2006). In order to be able to function as an intermediary between citizen and organization, and play their part in the regulatory trust triangle described by Six and Verhoest earlier in this volume, regulatory regimes thus need

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Frédérique Six and Hans Van Ees

interorganizational regulatory relations. After a brief overview of trust, trust building processes and Zand’s model, we introduce our case study design and the two cases. We performed a detailed reconstruction of the regulatory processes between a public ­regulator – Dutch water boards in charge of water management, licensing and enforcement – and a public regulatee – Dutch local authorities developing new housing districts; in other words, relationship 7 in Six and Verhoest’s mapping of trust relationships in regulatory regimes 60 M4123-SIX_TEXT (v2).indd 60 14/12/2016 11

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Haiko Van der Voort

7. Trust and cooperation over the public–private divide: an empirical study on trust evolving in co-­regulation Haiko Van der Voort TRUSTING PARTNERS IN CASE OF CO-­REGULATION Public regulators and inspectorates increasingly involve self-­regulation in their regulatory regimes. Well-­known features of self-­regulation are certification and hallmark systems. Regulation then becomes more and more a mutual public and private coordination effort for compliance. If public and private actors cooperate for typical oversight activities, such as standard setting

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Russell W. Mills and Dorit Rubinstein Reiss

2. The role of trust in the regulation of complex and high-­risk industries: the case of the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration’s voluntary disclosure programs Russell W. Mills and Dorit Rubinstein Reiss As part of the shift from command and control to process oriented regulatory regimes (Gilad, 2010), building trust between regulators and the regulated firms has grown in importance. Collaborative mechanisms often rely on a free-­flow of information and communication, which requires the building and maintenance of trust. This exchange of information and trust

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David T. Llewellyn

degree of trust and confidence in finance and financial institutions is likely to be weak in the absence of credible measures for consumer protection. The same applies to prudential regulation and supervision of financial institutions. Equally, all stakeholders or potential stakeholders in the financial system have an interest in systemic stability. More specifically, dedicated measures to address financial exclusion are likely to have limited effectiveness in the absence of adequate arrangements for the three core elements of the regulatory regime: systemic stability

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Mary Christina Wood

towards self-­dealing. Enforced against government trustees, this principle could counter the corruptive influence of campaign contributions from industries that expect favorable regulatory treatment in return. While the Citizens United decision would still allow massive campaign contributions, courts enforcing this trust duty could void and remand tainted decisions, thereby draining the incentive behind campaign financing. (2) Do not favor one class of beneficiaries over the other: “[T]he trustee has an obligation to deal impartially with all beneficiaries.”21 (3