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David Laidler

could find in 200 years of literature was by Friedman, who put the duration of significant non-neutralities in the wake of monetary shocks at anything between three to ten years (see Blaug 1995, p. 42). But Friedman’s answer came accompanied by his natural unemployment rate hypothesis, and this made Mark uncomfortable. First of all, this hypothesis contradicted David Hume’s apparently affirmative answer to the second of Mark’s two questions about non-neutralities. And second, Friedman’s vagueness about the time interval over which his natural-rate hypothesis was

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Harro Maas

historiography of economics (1991). That is small surprise as the writing of the history of economics was a subject of his enduring interest. Mark Blaug was born on 3 April 1927 in The Hague in a family from Austrian-Jewish origin. He grew up in Amsterdam in the 1930s (where he remembered playing with Anne Frank). His father ran a successful business in raincoats that was located at the Keizersgracht in the city centre, close to the (then) headquarters of the daily newspaper of the communist party. The family left the Netherlands in time. Blaug entered the US via England and

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Edited by Marcel Boumans and Matthias Klaes

This collection of eminent contributions discusses the ideas and works of Mark Blaug, who has made important and often pioneering contributions to economic history, economic methodology, the economics of education, development economics, cultural economics, economic theory and the history of economic thought. Besides these assessments of Blaug’s influence and impact in these fields, this volume also contains a selection of personal portraits which depict him as a colleague, a friend and an opponent. Blaug was also a voracious reader and prolific writer, which is clearly evidenced by the comprehensive bibliography.
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Richard G. Lipsey

had little possibility of servicing them once the initial low payment period was over. By then the sellers had repackaged the mortgages and, with the aid of rating agencies, classified them as low risk and sold them both domestically and internationally. When the higher interest payments kicked in, defaults rose dramatically and the building boom came to an abrupt halt. Many lost their homes while others, even though they could sustain their mortgages, had to cut other spending. The resulting collapse in demand was followed by a major recession. Two explanations of