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Patrick A. McNutt

. ANTITRUST AND THE REGULATED FIRM There are two main bodies of thought on deregulation: public interest theory, where deregulation can be analysed in terms of the changes (increases) in net economic welfare; and public choice theory, where producers, regulators and consumers try to maximise real income or economic rent of their respective groups. The economic theory for government intervention has been couched in the debate on a natural monopoly, and whether or not it is socially efficient to have only one fIrm in the industry, even if it is only to reduce duplication of

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Patrick A. McNutt

to ask: why not trust the rich individual to redistribute £100 to the poor individual? Equivalent to an effective tax rate of 10 per cent, a fact-finder would apply a calculus to the likely disincentive effect of such a rate weighed against the moral hazard of the poor individual, whom in the knowledge of a certain sum of £100 would be less inclined to work and earn in order to subsist. So why redistribute at all? Does it deter stealing? Some may argue that stealing is morally wrong for the rich man and sometimes morally right for the poor man, because the

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Patrick A. McNutt

then has to balance the interests of an incumbent versus an entrant or a complainant versus a defendant. The approach relegates rights to the attainment of the public interest. It may be in the public interest to facilitate entry, notwithstanding the harm caused to the incumbent. No matter how great this harm, it does not give the incumbent the right to prevent or retard entry. However, it may be in their interests to do so, and public choice scholars refer to this as 'rent-seeking' (McNutt, 2002; Tullock, 1989). Therefore, the regulator in setting policy should be

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Patrick A. McNutt

caring defendant. The defendant receives an endowment Wo and WI and we have an interest rate factor p such that: (7.2) With a budget constraint: (7.3) For the defendant compensation at time period to before any crime is committed must exceed any estimate opportunity cost accruing to not committing a crime as measured by the worth of the crime wo: Co (t) > Wo This inequality indicates how much 'crime' as a commodity is worth to a potential criminal. Within the economic model the objective is to find an expression for C 1(t+l) expressed as a measure of the future

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Patrick A. McNutt

often at zero price and zero marginal cost. The new economic systems are neither isolated nor closed but rely on a latent biology of activity evolving from the behaviour and the interactions of the firms. The emphasis is less on the physical character of a market, and more on the natural process within a market open to new technology and innovations yet powerful enough to reveal the indeterminism associated with dialectical concepts of harm, injury and amending them to include duty and responsibility. Time not price becomes the final arbiter as products and services

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Killian J. McCarthy and Tao Zhu

borrowing more expensive, and lowers the rates of investment in property, while a rise in long-term interest rates suggests a positive outlook, rising property prices, and economic growth, and this attractiveness of current investment. Finally, we observe that the average income level is positively related with property sale, and that a 1 per cent rise in the former causes a 3.5 per cent expansion in the latter. This, again, is an intuitive finding, and taken together the results of Model 1 provides evidence in support of Hypothesis 1, on the natural and familiar

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Wilfred Dolfsma

but certainly not developing countries – it is under these circumstances that the general interest of the two groups of countries conflict.10 Pooling of patents may be efficient, but it certainly also constitutes an entry barrier and is disadvantageous for smaller firms (Lanjouw and Schankermann 2004).11 Litigation costs can be so inhibitive that individual and small firm patent holders strike a deal with a large firm that filed a suit even when on legal grounds they would have a strong case; listed firms have lower filing rates (Lanjouw and Schankermann 2004

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Government Failure

Society, Markets and Rules

Wilfred Dolfsma

This highly unique book takes a fundamental look at when and how a government can fail at its core responsibility of formulating rules. Government, representing society, relates to the economy by formulating the rules within which (market) players should operate. Although market and business failure are much discussed in the economics literature, government failure is often overlooked. This book addresses this gap, exploring in detail what constitutes government failure.