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John Kwan

1 Introduction The right for victims of cartel infringements to claim damages is well-established. This article argues that claimants in cartel damages actions have sought to convert this right to sue into an automatic entitlement to damages. This involves the deployment of tactics aimed at minimizing engagement with the underlying facts at all stages of the proceedings. This ‘post-fact’ approach has received some support from the English Courts. 1 Recent judgments have, however, cast doubt on the viability of this ‘post-fact’ approach. 2 The Courts have

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Terry Calvani

15. Cartel penalties and damages in Ireland: criminalization and the case for custodial sentences Terry Calvani1 1 INTRODUCTION Price-fixing, and related ‘hard-core’ cartel behaviour,2 are theft and recognized to be such under Irish law. The Competition Act, 2002 addresses price-fixing in two ways: first, it is a crime on indictment and the Act vests the Competition Authority and the Director of Public Prosecutions with the power to investigate and prosecute respectively.3 Upon conviction, individuals may be sentenced to a maximum of five years imprisonment and

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Lara Hall

1 Introduction In recent years there has been a proliferation of competition damages claims in the English courts against the backdrop of legislative developments aimed at encouraging such claims, including the expansion of the jurisdiction of the Competition Appeal Tribunal (‘CAT’) and the advent of the collective actions regime for competition law damages claims in October 2015, 1 and the implementation of the EU Antitrust Damages Directive. 2 Although some non-cartel competition damages claims have proceeded to judgment, 3 the October 2018 judgment in the

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Edward Coulson and Andrew Leitch

1. Introduction This article follows our earlier article in the Competition Law Journal , 1 which discussed the High Court's decision to strike out the follow-on damages claims brought by companies within the iiyama group (‘iiyama’) in relation to cartelized cathode ray tube glass (‘CRT Glass’) and cathode ray tubes (‘CRT’) ( iiyama v. Schott 2 (‘ iiyama 1 ’)), and to narrow iiyama's claims in relation to cartelized liquid crystal displays (‘LCD’) ( iiyama v. Samsung 3 (‘ iiyama 2 ’)). iiyama appealed those decisions and the Court of Appeal has now handed

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Andrew Leitch

1 Introduction Damages claims which follow on from European Commission (‘Commission’) cartel decisions are, by their very nature, multinational in scope, with addressees of a Commission decision often domiciled across various EU Member States and further afield. As multiple national markets are often affected by the anticompetitive conduct, potential claimants are also often domiciled across the EU and beyond. This can often present potential claimants with a choice as to the jurisdiction in which they wish to pursue their damages claims, with the United Kingdom

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Simon Vande Walle

to have a contract declared null and void. These lawsuits have led to landmark judgments from the highest courts in both jurisdictions, clarifying the conditions under which claimants can obtain relief for antitrust violations. There is, however, a striking difference between the two countries: whereas the Dutch courts have become a hot spot for follow-on cartel damages actions, very few such actions have been filed in Belgium. This presents a puzzle because the Belgian and Dutch legal systems are relatively similar. One would therefore expect a similar level of

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Frank Maier-Rigaud and Ulrich Schwalbe

JOBNAME: Ashton PAGE: 1 SESS: 20 OUTPUT: Fri Nov 15 11:38:38 2013 8 QUANTIFICATION OF ANTITRUST DAMAGES* Frank Maier-Rigaud** and Ulrich Schwalbe*** I INTRODUCTION II DAMAGE CAUSED BY CARTELS AND ABUSIVE CONDUCT A Damage caused by cartels 1 Types of damage caused by cartels 2 Economic actors damaged by cartels a Upstream effects b Downstream effects c Effects on producers of complements d Summary of effects analysis 3 Illustration B Damage caused by abusive conduct 1 Types of damage caused by exploitative and exclusionary conduct 2 Economic actors damaged by

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QUANTIFICATION OF ANTITRUST DAMAGES

Law and Practice, Second Edition

Frank Maier-Rigaud and Ulrich Schwalbe

COMPETITION DAMAGES ACTIONS IN THE EU 14 QUANTIFICATION OF ANTITRUST DAMAGES 1 Frank Maier-Rigaud 2 and Ulrich Schwalbe 3 I.    INTRODUCTION 14.01 II.    DAMAGE CAUSED BY CARTELS AND ABUSIVE CONDUCT 14.05 A.    Damage caused by cartels 14.10 1.    Types of damage caused by cartels 14.10 2.    Economic actors damaged by cartels 14.20 a.    Upstream effects 14.24 b.    Downstream effects 14.27 c.    Effects on producers of complements 14.33 d.    Summary of effects analysis 14.34 3

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John M. Connor

imposed on cartel managers, nor is this possible in all but a few of its Member States.8 Cartel enforcement is weakest in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. There are a few rising stars on these continents, but government entities rarely see their efforts complemented by significant private settlements or damages awards to aggrieved cartel victims. North America: the epicenter of private enforcement Criminal enforcement The Antitrust Division of the US Department of Justice (DOJ) pioneered the convictions of international cartels 65 years ago.9 But for 50 years thereafter

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Kai Hüschelrath and Jürgen Weigand

customers and consumers, Section 4 addresses the complementary question of how a cartel ban should be enforced by a competition authority, affected private parties and the respective court system. With respect to public enforcement, the assessment of both ex ante tools to reduce the incentives to form cartels and ex post tools to detect and intervene against existing cartels figures prominently. By contrast, in the economic assessment of private enforcement we will concentrate on the identification and quantification of the damages caused by hard core cartels. Finally, as