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Lara Hall

1 Introduction In recent years there has been a proliferation of competition damages claims in the English courts against the backdrop of legislative developments aimed at encouraging such claims, including the expansion of the jurisdiction of the Competition Appeal Tribunal (‘CAT’) and the advent of the collective actions regime for competition law damages claims in October 2015, 1 and the implementation of the EU Antitrust Damages Directive. 2 Although some non-cartel competition damages claims have proceeded to judgment, 3 the October 2018 judgment in the

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John Kwan

2017, 14 the Damages Directive 15 provides that a cartel infringement is presumed to have caused harm. 16 This presumption, however, does not extend to quantification of the amount of harm caused to a particular claimant. 17 The burden therefore continues to lie with a claimant to prove that it suffered loss as a result of the infringement. For this reason, in BritNed v ABB , Mr Justice Marcus Smith questioned whether a bare presumption of harm ‘takes matters any further at all’ and considered that this did not ‘particularly [assist] in the assessment of damages

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Marcus Smith

interface, to translate the very complex into something the intelligent layperson can understand. However, I do think it is incumbent upon the judge – perhaps with a little prompting from the advocates – to identify areas where he or she feels uncomfortable. On day 3 of the BritNed 3 trial – after opening submissions, but before the hearing of evidence – we had what came to be known as a ‘teach in’. Both experts were asked to explain their own methodology, in neutral terms. Both the advocates and the judge could ask questions, but only neutral or clarificatory (not

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Matthew O'Regan

enforcement of competition law, as a complement to its work and that of national competition authorities (‘NCAs’) in their administrative enforcement of competition law, in particular the Antitrust Damages Directive 2 (which was intended to remove practical obstacles to recovering compensation) and the Recommendation on collective redress. 3 Such actions have been a fertile source of work for lawyers and economists and have thrown up all manner of legal issues, ranging from jurisdictional issues and questions about limitation periods, to questions of substantive law, the

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Andrew Leitch

1 Introduction Damages claims which follow on from European Commission (‘Commission’) cartel decisions are, by their very nature, multinational in scope, with addressees of a Commission decision often domiciled across various EU Member States and further afield. As multiple national markets are often affected by the anticompetitive conduct, potential claimants are also often domiciled across the EU and beyond. This can often present potential claimants with a choice as to the jurisdiction in which they wish to pursue their damages claims, with the United Kingdom

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Adrien de Hauteclocque

spike in France in 2009445). Implementing FTR is complicated in Europe as national market designs are not harmonized enough and regulatory supervision over cross-border infrastructure is insufficient. Until recently, merchant transmission investment was considered a relatively minor issue in Europe. This has changed subsequent to the authorizations granted by European authorities to several merchant projects: the interconnector Estlink between the Baltic and Nordic electricity markets, BritNed between the UK and the Netherlands, the two East West Cables between the UK

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Market Building through Antitrust

Long-term Contract Regulation in EU Electricity Markets

Adrien de Hauteclocque

Market Building through Antitrust investigates the role of antitrust policy in the building of competitive energy markets in Europe. By looking at the specific problem of long-term supply and access contracts in the electricity sector, the book questions the suitability of antitrust policy as a market building tool. It shows that the institutional infrastructure that pre-dated competitive reform and the politics of liberalization have largely shaped the current dynamics at work in European energy regulatory practice. In particular, antitrust law has increasingly been used as a quasi-ex ante regulatory tool, thereby raising problems in terms of economic efficiency, legal certainty and political legitimacy.
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Electricity Network Regulation in the EU

The Challenges Ahead‎ for Transmission and Distribution

Edited by Leonardo Meeus and Jean-Michel Glachant

The UK model of incentive regulation of power grids was at one time the most advanced, and elements of it were adopted throughout the EU. This model worked well, particularly in the context of limited investment and innovation, a single and strong regulatory authority, and limited coordination between foreign grid operators. This enlightening book shows that since 2010 the whole context has changed and regulation has had to catch-up and evolve. The EU is entering a wave of investment, and an era of new services and innovation which has created growing tensions between national regulatory authorities in terms of coordinating technical standards and distribution systems. This is being played out against an increasingly disruptive backdrop of digitzation, new market platforms and novel business models.