You are looking at 1 - 10 of 71 items

  • Series: Elgar Law, Technology and Society series x
Clear All Modify Search
You do not have access to this content

Alina Ng

The American Constitution empowers Congress to enact copyright laws to ‘promote the progress of science and the useful arts’. This book offers the first in-depth analysis of the connection between copyright law as a legal institution and the constitutional goal of promoting social and cultural advancement.
You do not have access to this content

Edited by Jessica C. Lai and Antoinette Maget Dominicé

Traditionally, in order to be protected intellectual property goods have almost always needed to be embodied or materialised (and – to a certain extent – to be used and enjoyed), regardless of whether they were copyrighted works, patented inventions or trademarks. This book examines the relationship between intellectual property and its physical embodiments and materialisations, with a focus on the issue of access and the challenges of new technologies. Expert contributors explore how these problems can re-shape our theoretical notion of the intangible and the tangible and how this can have serious consequences for access to intellectual property goods.
This content is available to you

Edited by David Mangan and Lorna E. Gillies

This content is available to you

Edited by David Mangan and Lorna E. Gillies

This content is available to you

Edited by David Mangan and Lorna E. Gillies

This content is available to you

Edited by David Mangan and Lorna E. Gillies

This content is available to you

Edited by David Mangan and Lorna E. Gillies

This content is available to you

David Mangan and Lorna E. Gillies

You do not have access to this content

Andrew D. Murray

Since its inception as a stand-alone topic of scholarship in the 1990s, cyberlaw has been a study in regulatory theory. We have discussed systems of regulation and tools of regulatory enforcement. We have divided groups into techno-determinists and libertarians/communitarians and we have discussed effectiveness and legitimacy. The missing element of much cyberlaw study has been the law element. We have focused too extensively on the cyber and too little on the law. This chapter seeks to rebalance and refocus cyberlaw on the key element, the jurisprudential structure of cyberlaw, in particular to examine the question of the rule of law (or its absence) in cyberspace. In so doing it seeks to form the foundations of a cyberlaw jurisprudence by asking some difficult normative questions: Can a rule of law exist online? If so who is the legitimate lawmaker and what values are enshrined by cyberlaw? Keywords: rule of law; cyberlaw; jurisprudence; jurisdiction

You do not have access to this content

Jacob Rowbottom

A number of high-profile cases have demonstrated the way that expression on the social media can be subject to criminal prosecution. Laws designed to regulate public order, nuisance telephone calls and harassment have been applied to internet speech. While there is no case for suggesting that internet speech should have an immunity, it is notable that remarks made on social networks in the heat of the moment (albeit grossly offensive) have been subject to criminal prosecution. Had such remarks been made in another social setting, such as a conversation in a cafe, it is unlikely that they would have come to the attention of prosecutors. The recordable and searchable nature of the digital media makes it more likely that law enforcement officers will notice informal conversations and the recorded data provides evidence for prosecution. In addition, the criminal laws in question are often broadly worded and could potentially apply to a wide range of expression. The practical result of these trends is an extension of the criminal law into people’s everyday conversations, which raises issues about the protection for freedom of expression. The first issue is whether the use of the criminal law is proportionate in such cases? While criminal prosecution will be justified in the most serious instances of abuse and harassment, alternatives to the criminal law might be considered as an option to deal with other cases. Another strategy may be to increase the threshold of harm required before a prosecution can be brought. To some extent, the DPP’s guidelines on social media cases have addressed these issues in practice. That does not, however, resolve the free speech concerns in relation to the substance of the law. A second issue for freedom of expression is that most of the offences being applied to the social media do not have an explicit public interest defence. As a result, the law could be invoked against those expressing political views. While the free speech issues could be incorporated into the interpretation of the law, an analogy with public order cases demonstrates why such an approach is likely to be deficient. When approaching such issues the courts have often assessed freedom of expression from the perspective of the audience, and placed little weight on the participation rights of the speaker. The courts have in some cases treated those types of speech that engage the criminal law as unnecessary abuse or noise, rather than an exercise of expression rights. While the matter has not yet been fully tested in the courts, there is a danger of a similar approach being taken in relation to internet speech. It will be argued that such an approach would be too dismissive of the speech rights at stake. Keywords: freedom of expression; malicious communications; offensive communications; prosecution policy; public order law