Show Less

Monetary History, Exchange Rates and Financial Markets

Essays in Honour of Charles Goodhart, Volume Two

Edited by Paul Mizen

Monetary History, Exchange Rates and Financial Markets is an impressive collection of original papers in honour of Charles Goodhart’s outstanding contribution to monetary economics and policy. Charles Goodhart has written extensively on many of these topics and has become synonymous with his field; the chapters within this book offer a summary of current thinking on his own research subjects and include perspectives on controversies surrounding them.
Buy Book in Print
Show Summary Details
You do not have access to this content


Dirk Schoenmaker


of ‘Is there a Goodhart’s Law in financial regulation?’ and ‘Working with market forces’ Dirk Schoenmaker 1. INTRODUCTION I started to work with Charles on financial regulation at the LSE Financial Markets Group in the Summer of 1991, just after the collapse of BCCI. Charles has always been very mindful of the fact that failures can (and should)1 happen and that supervisors will be criticised for it, rightly or wrongly. Both Andrew Sheng and Michael Foot seem to acknowledge this point from practical experience. The origin of Charles’s work on regulation is twofold. First, in his masterpiece ‘The Evolution of Central Banks’ Charles showed that central banks started off in their micro-capacity as crisis managers (lender of last resort) and that only later the macro-monetary policy side of central banks came to prominence (Goodhart, 1985, 1988a). Second, with the establishment of the SIB, the legal predecessor of the FSA, in the mid eighties, Charles became involved in the regulatory debate on the economics of regulation and started to write on issues such as the costs of regulation (Goodhart, 1988b). I have learned much from Charles about the central bank roots of regulation and will finish my discussion with some unsettled issues in that domain. In Chapter 9, Andrew Sheng argues that Goodhart’s Law helps to explain why financial regulation can fall short in its target to achieve financial stability. In Chapter 10, Michael Foot shows how the regulator may work with market forces. The supporting arguments are well...

You are not authenticated to view the full text of this chapter or article.

Elgaronline requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books or journals. Please login through your library system or with your personal username and password on the homepage.

Non-subscribers can freely search the site, view abstracts/ extracts and download selected front matter and introductory chapters for personal use.

Your library may not have purchased all subject areas. If you are authenticated and think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

Further information

or login to access all content.