Show Less

The Endogenous Formation of Economic Coalitions

Edited by Carlo Carraro

This important book, written by some of the leading scholars in the field, provides a comprehensive overview of recent advances in coalition theory and presents both the latest theoretical developments and novel applications in the field of economics.
Buy Book in Print
Show Summary Details
You do not have access to this content

Chapter 6: Endogenous coalition formation in global pollution control: a partition function approach

Michael Finus and Bianca Rundshagen


Michael Finus and Bianca Rundshagen 1. 1.1 INTRODUCTION General Remarks Concern about transboundary and global pollution problems ranks prominently on the agenda of international politics and has led to the signature of several international environmental agreements (IEAs), as for instance the Oslo Protocol on sulfur reduction in Europe in 1994, the Montreal Protocol on the depletion of the ozone layer in 1987, and the Kyoto Protocol on the reduction of greenhouse gases in 1997. This concern is also reflected in numerous recent papers (for example, Barrett (1997a, b); Botteon and Carraro (1997, 1998); Carraro and Moriconi (1998); Germain et al. (1996) and Germain et al. (1998)) on the formation of coalitions in international pollution control since the appearance of Barrett (1991), Bauer (1992) Black et al. (1992), Carraro and Siniscalco (1991), Chander and Tulkens (1992), Hoel (1992) and Tulkens (1979). The fundamental assumption of all models is that IEAs must be self-enforcingly designed since there is no international agency that can establish binding agreements (Endres, 1997). Consequently, the main problem of cooperation in international pollution control is that of freeriding. In reality there are two types of free-riding that negatively affect the success of an IEA (Finus, 2002). The first type of free-riding is the incentive of a country to remain a non-signatory or to take on less climate responsibility than other countries, thus benefiting from the higher abatement efforts of neighboring countries. The second type of free-riding relates to the incentive of joining an agreement...

You are not authenticated to view the full text of this chapter or article.

Elgaronline requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books or journals. Please login through your library system or with your personal username and password on the homepage.

Non-subscribers can freely search the site, view abstracts/ extracts and download selected front matter and introductory chapters for personal use.

Your library may not have purchased all subject areas. If you are authenticated and think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

Further information

or login to access all content.