The Politics of Regulation
Show Less

The Politics of Regulation

Institutions and Regulatory Reforms for the Age of Governance

  • The CRC Series on Competition, Regulation and Development

Edited by Jacint Jordana and David Levi-Faur

This book suggests that the scope and breadth of regulatory reforms since the mid-1980s and particularly during the 1990s, are so striking that they necessitate a reappraisal of current approaches to the study of the politics of regulation. The authors call for the adoption of different and fresh perspectives to examine this area.
Buy Book in Print
Show Summary Details

Chapter 12: Law in the Age of Governance: Regulation, Networks and Lawyers

Patrick Schmidt

Extract

12. Law in the age of governance: regulation, networks and lawyers Patrick Schmidt* The ‘Age of Governance’ has meant challenges to the centrality of state power, decreased relevance of formal models of administrative hierarchy, and recognition of interdependence among private and public actors (Haas, 1992; Marks et al., 1996; Strange, 1996; Pierre and Peters, 2000; Black, 2001a; Scott, 2001, Chapter 7 in this volume). At the same time, commentators have expressed a heightened concern for the expansion of US-style, adversarial legalism, which has been taken to mean heightened formality, rule-based relations and judicial management of regulatory interactions (Kagan, 2001; Keleman, 2002). The apparent paradox in the simultaneous decline of statecentred control and the rise of an ‘age of legalism’ dissolves on closer inspection: whereas it once might have been presumed that the state holds all the legal instruments of regulatory control, we now recognize that private sector regulated entities have numerous legal options available, and with those options firms have the ability to engage regulators at the bargaining table. The interdependence, continuing relationships and strategic interactions of public–private regulatory encounters are all consistent with a situation in which the legal setting of administrative regulation gives bargaining chips to both public and private actors. These two phenomena – more generally, the politics of public–private regulatory interaction and the legal realm in which regulatory policy-making finds its effect – are difficult to bring into a single conversation. Certainly, a notion of law, usually meaning the ‘hard law’ of formal decrees and binding...

You are not authenticated to view the full text of this chapter or article.

Elgaronline requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books or journals. Please login through your library system or with your personal username and password on the homepage.

Non-subscribers can freely search the site, view abstracts/ extracts and download selected front matter and introductory chapters for personal use.

Your library may not have purchased all subject areas. If you are authenticated and think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.


Further information

or login to access all content.