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International Handbook of Land and Property Taxation

Edited by Richard M. Bird and Enid Slack

This comprehensive Handbook explores case studies of land and property taxation in 25 countries (five in each of five regions – OECD, central and eastern Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America), and focuses on the potential contributions of the property tax to the revenues of urban and rural governments and to more efficient land use.
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Chapter 25: Taxes on Land and Property in Argentina

Ernesto Rezk


Ernesto Rezk Argentina is a three-tiered federation: in addition to the national government, there are 23 provinces plus the autonomous city of Buenos Aires and 1175 municipalities.1 Each layer of government is constitutionally endowed with ample fiscal powers and spending functions, but property and land taxes are basically at the subnational level. Property tax revenues are roughly $1.1 billion annually, $0.66 billion at the provincial and $0.44 billion at the municipal level respectively. In percentage terms, this annual revenue represents 1.1 percent of GDP (0.65 percent levied by provinces and 0.45 percent by municipalities). Property and land taxes yield a by no means negligible 5 percent of all tax revenues in Argentina. As shown in Table 25.1, in terms of provincial own fiscal resources, property and land taxes are second only to the turnover tax, contributing in the period 16 percent of consolidated provincial fiscal revenues compared to almost 57 percent contributed by the latter. The second and third columns of the table show that the collection of the tax is concentrated in the main provinces (City of Buenos Aires, Buenos Aires, Córdoba, Mendoza and Santa Fé), which together account for almost 90 percent of the total yield. At the municipal level, this tax is by far the most important fiscal resource, amounting to 35 percent of municipal fiscal revenues. As mentioned above, constitutional arrangements in Argentina permit overlapping of fiscal sources, since the use of one tax or a tax base by one government level does not preclude...

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