Nuclear Weapons, Justice and the Law
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Nuclear Weapons, Justice and the Law

Elli Louka

It is often argued that the nuclear non-proliferation order divides the world into nuclear-weapon-haves and have-nots, creating a nuclear apartheid. Employing a careful and nuanced discussion of this claim, Elli Louka examines the architecture of the nuclear non-proliferation order, the fairness and effectiveness of international and regional institutions and scenarios for the future of nuclear weapons.
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Chapter 7: Just and Effective International Institutions

Elli Louka

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7. Just and effective international institutions 1. THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY An easy way to preempt proliferation is monopoly: to give one or a few countries control over the proliferation-prone stages of the nuclear fuel cycle. The first time a nuclear monopoly was attempted was in 1946 when the United States and its allies established a group to control the spread of atomic energy. The group was to function through the possession of an overwhelming quantity of raw material so that countries left outside the group would have to pay a price for admission to the group, that price being the denunciation of nuclear weapons. Based on this idea, the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada established the Joint Development Agency to control the uranium market. They achieved such control by buying all available deposits of uranium outside the Soviet Union. Their effort failed in 1963 when South Africa agreed to supply France with uranium at lower prices than the agency without requiring any safeguards.1 In 1946, the Baruch plan was presented to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC)2 by the United States representative to the commission, Bernard Baruch. The plan sought to establish an International Atomic Development Authority (IADA) that would own or control all proliferation-prone components of the nuclear fuel cycle including all uranium mining, processing, conversion and enrichment facilities. Only activities that were not proliferation-prone would be conducted at the national level and with a license granted by the authority.3...

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