Nuclear Weapons, Justice and the Law
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Nuclear Weapons, Justice and the Law

Elli Louka

It is often argued that the nuclear non-proliferation order divides the world into nuclear-weapon-haves and have-nots, creating a nuclear apartheid. Employing a careful and nuanced discussion of this claim, Elli Louka examines the architecture of the nuclear non-proliferation order, the fairness and effectiveness of international and regional institutions and scenarios for the future of nuclear weapons.
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Chapter 10: Controlling Nuclear Weapons

Elli Louka


1. THE MILITARY–INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX The reason nations have weapons and covert nuclear devices is that they do not trust each other. Even if there were a way to force states to disarm, it would not do away with the lack of trust. Forced disarmament, when suspicion reigns, would fuel imagination about new ways to inflict harm on real or hypothetical adversaries. The Cold War was ruled by an action/reaction syndrome – good weapons produced by a state had to be offset by the better weapons of its adversary. This action/reaction dynamic was supported by the weapons industry that kept producing new weapons and technologies. The abundance of weapons and technologies seemed to be out of proportion to what common sense would require for war preparedness.1 Many argued that, instead of state demand fuelling industry production, industry production had become a force in itself that fuelled weapons demand. This so-called military–industrial complex, which thrived on innovation in military technology, was at the root of the arms race, including the nuclear arms race.2 The military–industrial complex includes not only the weapons industry and the military but also scientists and engineers who develop nuclear weapons, politicians who want to retain employment by military companies and military bases in localities that elect them to office, and various government institutions supporting the nuclear apparatus.3 Defense companies, localities dependent on the military, and the Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy 317–21 (2003). Id. 3 There are a number of institutions in NWS...

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