Theory and Policy
- The Loyola de Palacio Series on European Energy Policy
Edited by Pippo Ranci and Guido Cervigni
In the market design discussed so far, known as an ‘energy-only’ market, generators obtain revenues (only) from selling electricity and ancillary services. In this context, persistently high electricity and ancillary service prices are relied upon to attract investment in generation capacity when the existing capacity is below the equilibrium level. Conversely, low electricity and ancillary service prices discourage capital accumulation when installed capacity is above the equilibrium level. As in most other markets, the level of installed production capacity in energy-only markets is determined by the interaction between demand and supply of the final products supplied. This differs substantially from the traditional approach, in which utilities meet reliability and resource adequacy requirements according to engineering standards regarding the acceptable hours of load shedding, based on the expected load variance and generator availability. In the energy-only design, market forces rather than engineering standards determine the installed capacity, and ultimately the level of reliability.
You are not authenticated to view the full text of this chapter or article.
Elgaronline requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books or journals. Please login through your library system or with your personal username and password on the homepage.
Non-subscribers can freely search the site, view abstracts/ extracts and download selected front matter and introductory chapters for personal use.
Your library may not have purchased all subject areas. If you are authenticated and think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.