The Goals of Competition Law
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The Goals of Competition Law

Edited by Daniel Zimmer

What are the normative foundations of competition law? That is the question at the heart of this book. Leading scholars consider whether this branch of law serves just one or more than one goal, and, if it serves to protect unfettered competition as such, how this goal relates to other objectives such as the promotion of economic welfare.
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Chapter 25: Agricultural Markets and Competition Policy in Latin America: Conflicts of Goals, Rules and Enforcement Policies – Comment on Gutiérrez Rodríguez

Carlos Pablo Márquez


Carlos Pablo Márquez* 92 1 INTRODUCTION The previous chapter by Mr Juan Gutiérrez-Rodríguez has shown a very long picture of the ‘state of the art’ regarding agricultural markets and competition law enforcement in Latin America. Despite the fact that there are several observations regarding form and methodology, in this comment, due to time and subject constraints, I am only going to focus on a set of general remarks on conflicting economic policies and the enforcement of competition law in LATAM agricultural markets. Before starting, I must state that most of the points I will raise here are not explicitly stated in the chapter; several of them have been deduced by a profound reading of the author’s chapter. I apologize in advance to the author for trying to read his mind, but it is my first criticism that the author seemed tremendously shy of stating his own perspective on the topic and played a passive descriptive role, showing only what has happened in Latin America, avoiding more valuable whys, shoulds and oughts. In fact, the more interesting questions of his chapter ‘should competition laws be displaced by other public policies’ goals in agricultural markets in Latin America?’ and ‘do agricultural markets in Latin America have peculiar features that justify exemptions or exceptions to competition laws?’ have not been directly and explicitly * Superintendent for Antitrust and Competition Policy, Government of Colombia, DPhil Law (Cand) Oxford, LLM (Harvard). Lecturer of Law and Economics and Regulation of Financial Institutions,...

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