Edited by Robert Halvorsen and David F. Layton
Chapter 10: Structuring rights and privileges in catch share systems
The absence of property rights leads to the dissipation of resource rents in fisheries and, quite often, to depletion of fishery stocks below levels that can support maximum sustainable yield (MSY). Even when catches are strictly limited to maintain the biological productivity of the fishery, rent dissipation can be expected to persist as a result of overcapitalization and a race for fish which can both increase costs and decrease the value of landings (Homans and Wilen 1997). Economists have long recommended the assignment of property rights1 to the fishery as a means to internalize the stock externality2 that leads to rent dissipation (Gordon 1954; Scott 1955).
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