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Constitutional Economics and Public Institutions
Edited by Francisco Cabrillo and Miguel A. Puchades-Navarro
This extensive book explores in detail a wide range of topics within the public choice and constitutional political economy tradition, providing a comprehensive overview of current work across the field.
Monograph Book
- Published in print:
- 31 May 2013
- ISBN:
- 9781781003961
- eISBN:
- 9781781003978
- Pages:
- 384
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- 01 Constitutional Economics and Public Institutions
- 01 Copyright
- 01 Contents
- 01 Contributors
- 01 Foreword
- 01 Introduction
- Chapter 1: Presuppositions in the evaluation of rules
- Chapter 2: Buchanan, Hobbes and contractarianism: the supply of rules?
- Chapter 3: Economics governance in the European Union: a problem of legitimacy
- Chapter 4: Early Spanish liberalism and constitutional political economy: the Cádiz Constitution of 1812
- Chapter 5: Reforms and decentralization: friends or foes?
- Chapter 6: Democracy-preserving institutions: the quasi-federal system of South Africa
- Chapter 7: On Machiavelli’s conspiracy paradoxes
- Chapter 8: A general measure of the ‘effective’ number of parties in a political system
- Chapter 9: Party competition and electoral turnout: Downs’s calculus in a multiparty system
- Chapter 10: The political economy of Dutch Disease: a survey
- Chapter 11: Higher education as private good and as quasi public good: the case of Italy
- Chapter 12: The actual role of government intervention for the recovery of the Italian economy
- Chapter 13: Government bankruptcy of Balkan nations and the consequences for money and inflation before 1914: a comparative analysis
- Chapter 14: Regulator preferences and lobbying efforts in rent-seeking contests
- Chapter 15: Cooperation in multilateral PDs: self-selected vs pre-defined groups
- Chapter 16: Voluntary provision of public goods
- Chapter 17: Awards play an important role
- Chapter 18: The optimal Babel: an economic framework for the analysis of dynamic language rights
- Chapter 19: A theory of conversion to exclusive religious and political faiths
- 01 Index
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Contributors
Monograph Chapter
- Published in print:
- 31 May 2013
- Category:
- Monograph Chapter
- Pages:
- ix–x (2 total)
Collection:
Economics 2013
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- 01 Constitutional Economics and Public Institutions
- 01 Copyright
- 01 Contents
- 01 Contributors
- 01 Foreword
- 01 Introduction
- Chapter 1: Presuppositions in the evaluation of rules
- Chapter 2: Buchanan, Hobbes and contractarianism: the supply of rules?
- Chapter 3: Economics governance in the European Union: a problem of legitimacy
- Chapter 4: Early Spanish liberalism and constitutional political economy: the Cádiz Constitution of 1812
- Chapter 5: Reforms and decentralization: friends or foes?
- Chapter 6: Democracy-preserving institutions: the quasi-federal system of South Africa
- Chapter 7: On Machiavelli’s conspiracy paradoxes
- Chapter 8: A general measure of the ‘effective’ number of parties in a political system
- Chapter 9: Party competition and electoral turnout: Downs’s calculus in a multiparty system
- Chapter 10: The political economy of Dutch Disease: a survey
- Chapter 11: Higher education as private good and as quasi public good: the case of Italy
- Chapter 12: The actual role of government intervention for the recovery of the Italian economy
- Chapter 13: Government bankruptcy of Balkan nations and the consequences for money and inflation before 1914: a comparative analysis
- Chapter 14: Regulator preferences and lobbying efforts in rent-seeking contests
- Chapter 15: Cooperation in multilateral PDs: self-selected vs pre-defined groups
- Chapter 16: Voluntary provision of public goods
- Chapter 17: Awards play an important role
- Chapter 18: The optimal Babel: an economic framework for the analysis of dynamic language rights
- Chapter 19: A theory of conversion to exclusive religious and political faiths
- 01 Index