The Evolution of China’s Anti-Monopoly Law
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The Evolution of China’s Anti-Monopoly Law

Xiaoye Wang

China's Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) is one of the youngest and most influential antitrust laws in the world today. This book aims to provide a better understanding of the evolution of China’s AML to the international community through a collection of essays from the most prominent antitrust scholar in China, Professor Xiaoye Wang.
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Chapter 10: The goals of China’s Anti-Monopoly Law

Xiaoye Wang


Similar to the formulation of other legal regimes, the first and most important issue in the formulation of the Anti-Monopoly Law is to clarify its legislative purpose. The legislative purpose is essentially the legislative objective, that is, why the state wished to enact an anti-monopoly law. The legislative purpose of the Anti-Monopoly Law is very important. Not only does it relate to the nature and character of the Anti-Monopoly Law but it also has important practical significance. As it is impossible for any anti-monopoly law to comprehensively regulate conduct or phenomena that restrict competition, when a restriction of competition is not clearly defined in the law – that is, when we have no specific legal basis to determine the legality of that conduct – we can look to the legislative purpose for guidance.The legislative purpose of anti-monopoly law remains a greatly debated topic among scholars around the world. The dominant view among German scholars is that the legislative objective of anti-monopoly law is to oppose monopolies and protect market competition as market competition is a process that reduces prices and improves quality, and thereby increases the competitiveness of enterprises and enhances consumer welfare. The view of the Chicago school in the United States is that the objective of anti-monopoly law is to increase economic efficiency. From the perspective of improving economic efficiency, under the influence of the Chicago school, since the 1980s the United States has rarely intervened in vertical or conglomerate mergers.

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