Edited by James Sperling
Chapter 6: Regional security governance
Any number of scholars have considered the domestic and systemic requirements for effective global security governance (notably, Holsti 1991; Adler and Barnett 1998; Keohane 2001; Jervis 2002). With the exception of Holsti, who addressed the necessary and sufficient conditions for system stability (defined as the absence of war), these scholars have been preoccupied with the preconditions for the emergence and persistence of a democratic security community in the transatlantic area and the barriers to its expansion on a global scale. The international system neither constitutes a democratic security community nor comes close to meeting the conditions necessary for one. Moreover, the international system can be decomposed into any number of discrete systems of regional security ranging from those that are relative autonomous (for example, the Southern Cone) from great power interference to those that are dominated by it (for example, Central Asia). Regional security has a long pedigree in the international relations literature (for an overview, see Fawcett 1995; Hurrell 1995; Fawn 2009), although much of the early literature reflected the bipolar distribution of power in the post-war period that gave rise to a preoccupation with formal treaty commitments and mutual defense (for example, Osgood 1960; Dinerstein 1965). The most significant step towards understanding the origin and dynamic of autonomous regional security orders is found in Buzan and Wæver’s ‘regional security complex theory’.
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